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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EVALUATING STATE POLICY INTERVENTIONS FOR OPIOID ABUSE AND DIVERSION:
THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS, HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, AND THE U.S. MARKET FOR
PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS

Prescription opioid pain reliever utilization has been increasing since the
1990s, due in part to changes in recommendations for the treatment of chronic
pain, but also to abuse and diversion. One innovative policy solution to the abuse
and diversion of prescription opioids is state prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs), which provide prescribers and other selected parties with
patient controlled substance dispensation history; thereby, correcting an
information asymmetry problem between prescribers and patients.
The widespread implementation of state PDMPs, which vary in program
design and requirements, has resulted in a variety of intended and unintended
consequences. Previous PDMP evaluations have suggested such outcomes as
the reduction of consumer access to opioids, the influencing of healthcare
provider prescribing behaviors for opioids, and the re-shaping of the United
States market for prescription opioids. PDMPs may also be associated with
unintended outcomes: namely, the restriction of pharmaceutical opioids could be
associated with an increase in heroin use, as evidenced by increases in heroin
substance abuse treatment facility discharges. The analyses in this project
examine the influence of PDMPs on healthcare providers and the market for
prescription drugs by comparing trends in opioid utilization in states with varying
PDMP features using Medicaid prescription utilization data and commercial
insurance claims. The effect of PDMPs on consumers is explored with an
analysis comparing substance abuse treatment facility discharge data for heroin
abuse with pharmaceutical opioid prescriptions before and after PDMP regulatory
change. Finally, the impact of other related opioid policy interventions, opioid
overdose medication access laws, are analyzed by comparing opioid overdose
mortality across states with differing overdose medication access policies over
time. Contributions to the understanding about the impacts of these state-level
opioid abuse and diversion policies can be used to improve or amplify intended
outcomes and ameliorate unintended consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
Professional healthcare organizations, government agencies, and law
enforcement entities have decried the abuse and diversion of prescription opioid
pain-relievers in the United States as an epidemic.1-3 Prescription drugs in
general, and opioids in particular, are now the second-most abused substance,
after marijuana.4 The consequences of opioid abuse and diversion for both public
safety and public health have lead to novel collaborations and conflicts between
healthcare providers and law enforcement on the policy front.
The spread of prescription opioid abuse and diversion has been attributed
to a host of factors that converged beginning in the late 1990s. The most widely
blamed of these factors includes the methods in which the medical community
addresses and manages chronic pain, the introduction of multiple high-strength
prescription

opioid

products

with

aggressive

marketing

campaigns

by

pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the changing preferences of consumers who
are more likely to view nonmedical use of prescription medications as “safer”
alternatives to illicit substance abuse.5 Figure 1.1 illustrates this trend of
simultaneous increases of visits to primary care providers for non-cancer pain
and the increasing proportion of those visits resulting in an opioid prescription.6
An unfortunate side effect of the improvement in access to chronic pain treatment
has arisen, with reports of nonmedical use of licit prescription opioids and illicit
heroin substitutes increasing (Figure 1.2),7 particularly in certain populations.
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Figure 1.1 created using data tables published by: Daubresse, Chang, et al. (2013) via the
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Data source used to create Figure 1.2: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA,
2013.
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% Pain Visits Resulting in an Opioid Prescription

Figure 1.1 United States Opioid Prescriptions Resulting from Care for Pain*

The most encompassing state-level policy innovation to address the
problems associated with prescription drug abuse and diversion are prescription
drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), which are state programs that track the
prescribing and dispensing of controlled prescription substances, such as
opioids, to individual consumers. The information on consumer controlled
substance prescription history is made available to authorized users, such as
healthcare providers or law enforcement officials, through reports generated by
the PDMP at request and/or through unsolicited automation to the relevant
parties. State PDMPs have proliferated throughout the nation; as of 2015, all
states but Missouri and the District of Columbia have operational programs
(Appendix A contains a list of the current legislative and operational status of all
state PDMPs).
The controlled substance prescription data managed by PDMPs mitigates
a multi-directional problem of information asymmetry: first, between healthcare
providers and their patients; second, between healthcare providers and law
enforcement (or regulatory agents such as medical licensure boards); and finally,
between law enforcement and consumers. This information asymmetry problem,
however, may not be overcome if relevant parties do not utilize PDMPs. States
report low PDMP utilization rates by prescribers of controlled substances in
particular, where states that have conducted evaluations found prescriber PDMP
utilization below 60 percent when not mandated by law or regulation.8-10
PDMPs have been accompanied by various supplemental legislation and
regulations at the state level to boost efforts to combat opioid abuse and
diversion problems; however, resulting evaluations of PDMPs and these related
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policy interventions have not reached definitive conclusions.10-15 The scope of
policy interventions in regards to opioid abuse and diversion is limited throughout
this dissertation to state PDMPs and state naloxone access laws. Naloxone
access laws are intended to ease access to the pharmaceutical opioid and/or
heroin overdose reversal medication named naloxone. Currently, 27 states have
some type of policy expanding access to naloxone, and 21 of these states
adopted their policies within the past 3 years.16 Naloxone access policies are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
For this dissertation a series of analyses was designed to examine the
impact of state PDMP policy interventions on consumers, the market for
prescription drugs, and healthcare providers in the United States. The “realworld” approach undertaken in this dissertation is conducted using policy variable
definitions that reflect the actual implementation rather than the presence of
PDMP features, while the data sources for the empirical analyses have been
employed to measure PDMP policy intervention outcomes using unique and
sometimes novel applications.
Chapters 1 and 2 provide background and rationale for PDMPs as an
innovative policy solution to the problem of prescription opioid abuse and
diversion, while orienting variations in state PDMP features in terms of a policy
theoretical framework. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effect of PDMP policies on
state Medicaid beneficiaries (Chapter 3) and claims data from commercially
insured patients (Chapter 4) by comparing trends in opioid utilization in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia, which have varying PDMP implementation
dates and program features. Chapter 5 moves away from analysis of the
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marketplace for prescription opioids and tackles an unintended consequence for
restrictions to access and supply of pharmaceutical opioids for consumers: that
is, a possible relationship between PDMP policy implementation and substance
abuse treatment discharge rates for heroin. Chapter 6 delves further into the
possible relationship between PDMPs, pharmaceutical opioid, and heroin
consumption by examining the impact of another opioid abuse policy
intervention, state-level naloxone access policies, on opioid overdose mortality in
all fifty states from 1999 through 2011. Illicit opioids such as heroin will be
included in the definition of opioid overdose, along with licit prescription opioids.
The final chapter, Chapter 7, synthesizes the analysis results from the previous
chapters to inform construction of policy recommendations for PDMPs and
naloxone access.
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CHAPTER ONE
State Policy Interventions for Opioid Abuse and Diversion:
A Review of the Literature on Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Chapter Summary: This chapter contains an in-depth accounting of the public health and public
safety problems associated with prescription controlled substance abuse and diversion. Focus is
narrowed to prescription opioids and the origins of state PDMPs, which were implemented in
reaction to abuse and diversion problems. The review process informed the development of three
emergent themes from the PDMP literature: the influence of PDMPs on consumer health
outcomes, the impact of PDMPs on the market for controlled substances, and the influence of
PDMPs on healthcare provider behaviors. Gaps in the literature were identified and several of
these gaps are addressed in the empirical analyses within following chapters.

The United States faces two intertwined public health crises: the persistent
under-treatment of chronic pain conditions,17-19 and the abuse and diversion of
the controlled substances used to treat chronic pain.1,20 The categorization of
some prescription drugs, including those used to treat chronic pain, as controlled
substances began with the 1970 Controlled Substances Act. The Controlled
Substances Act created a classification system that divided licit and illicit drugs
with abuse potential into five levels, called Schedules, and charged the Food and
Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement Administration with joint
responsibility for designating substances to this Schedule classification system.21
Criteria for controlled substance classification and example substances can be
seen in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1 Controlled Substance Scheduling
Schedule

Classification Criteria

Examples

I
II

High abuse potential, no medically acceptable use
High abuse potential, potential for psychological or physical
dependence
Some abuse potential, less potential for dependence than II
Low abuse potential relative to III
Low abuse potential relative to IV

Heroin, LSD
Morphine, Oxycodone

III
IV
V

Hydrocodone
Diazepam, Alprazolam
Cough medicines containing
Codeine

Advocates for improved pain treatment practices urge caution against the
adoption of state regulatory actions that influence prescriber practices through
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fear of scrutiny by pointing out that undertreated chronic pain tends to
disproportionately

affect

the

economically

disadvantaged,

women,

and

minorities.19 In response to these public health crises, the Wisconsin Pain and
Policy Studies Group developed the “Central Principle of Balance”, which calls
for drug policies and regulations to be evaluated in regards to a dual mission: to
reduce abuse and diversion while simultaneously supporting medically
appropriate treatment for pain.22
One of the major policy innovations proposed to address the problem of
the abuse and diversion of prescription medications is Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), which are state programs that track the
prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances to individual consumers. The
information on consumer controlled substance use history is made available to
certain health providers or law enforcement officials, depending upon individual
state program regulations, to serve the dual purpose of addressing the crisis of
chronically undertreated pain as well as reducing abuse and diversion.23 Though
states have adopted PDMPs to reduce abuse and diversion within their own
populations, controlled substance abuse and diversion represents an epidemic
that is costly to the nation as a whole. A 2009 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) investigative report into Medicaid fraud and abuse found that Medicaid
had funded approximately $63 million worth of direct payments for prescriptions
that were likely due to doctor shopping in 2006 and 2007, including about $2
million in payments to health care providers that had already been banned from
prescribing controlled substances.24
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The GAO estimate does not reflect indirect costs such as medical bills for
treatment, rehabilitative services, or law enforcement investigations. It was
recommended that states that had not yet done so adopt PDMPs to combat the
problem and states that already had implemented PDMPs should encourage
increased participation by health care professionals. A similar Government
Accountability Office investigation into Medicare Part D fraud and abuse
attributed an estimated $148 million in costs due to payments from doctor
shopping in 2008 alone.25
Nonmedical use of prescription drugs is most prevalent in rural or
suburban areas with limited access to cheap illicit drugs, and prescription drugs
are the second-most class of abused substance, after marijuana.1 Most providers
perceive “doctor shopping,” which is loosely defined as the process of visiting
multiple providers with the explicit purpose of obtaining controlled substances, to
be the primary cause of drug diversion but also express concerns about diversion
from online retailers.26 This perception is not borne out in reality because 55
percent of prescription substance abusers report that they obtain prescription
drugs for free from family and friends and not from doctor shopping or online
retailers.27 It is important to note, however, that doctor shopping behaviors occur
for opioid pain relievers more so than for any other class of controlled substance,
according to prescription tracking patterns observed in California’s PDMP. 28 This
is cause for concern because it is estimated that as many as 90 percent of
patients undergoing treatment for long-term chronic pain conditions will receive
prescriptions for the class of controlled substances known as opioids.5
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PDMPs and related policies address the legal and public health crises of
abuse and diversion by combining government authorities and medical practice
in a novel, and at times controversial, way. The specific aims for this literature
review are to:


describe the origin of PDMPs and related policies;



examine the controversial policy issues surrounding PDMPs;



evaluate the available evidence for PDMP efficacy; and,



analyze the unintended consequences associated with PDMP
implementation.

Methods
PubMed, JSTOR, and Google Scholar were used to search for
combinations of the following keywords and phrases: prescription drug
monitoring program, PDMP, PMP, controlled substance, opioids, monitoring, and
health policy. Literature was excluded if the topic lay outside of the scope of the
specific aims addressed, was published as a “letter to the editor” or opinion
piece, or was authored before 1999.
The Origins of PDMPs
In 1914 New York state passed a law that required physicians to use
duplicate, numbered forms to write prescriptions for certain prescription
medications, which were collected and stored by the prescribing physician and
were to be presented on demand to state authorities for inspections. 23 It was
California, however, that instituted the first official PDMP in 1939, which predated
the federal Controlled Substances Act by over 30 years. The California PDMP
required physicians to collect records of state-defined controlled substance
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prescribing using triplicate copies of prescriptions and forward those records to
public health and law enforcement agencies. Most other states did not adopt
PDMPs until the 1990s and 2000s and a variety of monitoring strategies have
since been attempted. As of 2015, 49 states have enacted legislation to create
PDMPs and 43 of those states have operational programs.29 See Appendix A for
more information on state PDMP enactment and operation status.
In a typical, contemporary PDMP, states require dispensers of controlled
substances (usually pharmacies) to submit electronic or paper reports for each
substance dispensed within one day to two weeks of dispensing. This data
transmission process varies across states, but each PDMP grants access to data
on an individual’s dispensing history to authorized PDMP users only. 30 Most
states with PDMPs grant access to controlled substance user data to prescribers,
dispensers of controlled substances, licensing authorities, and law enforcement
officials conducting investigations of potential illicit activities. Every state with a
PDMP monitors Schedule II controlled substances, but some choose not to
monitor controlled substances categorized as Schedules III, IV, and V due to less
perceived risk for abuse potential. Departmental authority varies from state to
state, but most PDMPs are housed within law enforcement departments,
departments of public health, boards of pharmacy, or other medical licensure
boards.31 The variability in state PDMP organization, management, and
monitoring activities due to competing public health and law enforcement
missions will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
Controversial PDMP Policy Issues
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PDMP policies frequently blur the boundaries between law enforcement
investigation and medical privacy because all state PDMPs rely on information
collected about individual patient dispensing and prescribing history. There is a
potential conflict between patient privacy as mandated by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 due to the possibility of law
enforcement officials or providers who are not treating the patient accessing
private patient prescription data.32 The Office of National Drug Control Policy
dismisses these privacy concerns by maintaining that PDMP records are
protected similarly to other medical records: “Law enforcement may not access
patient‐ specific PDMP data unless they have an active investigation, and
healthcare providers can access only the PDMP data relevant to their patients.” 33
Surveys collected from Virginia physicians, however, revealed that physicians in
that state mistrust law enforcement with patient data and remain skeptical of the
level of confidentiality being practiced for patient records and for physician
prescribing behaviors.8
State PDMPs have varying regulations for the access to and usage of
PDMP data. Proactive systems generate reports without solicitation for relevant
PDMP users when certain thresholds are met, whereas reactive systems require
PDMP users to request reports about prescribing or dispensing for an individual
patient’s records. Less than half of state programs currently have both the
technological capability and legal authority to generate unsolicited reports.34
Two

federal

initiatives

have

been

undertaken

to

promote

the

implementation of state PDMPs: first, the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring
Program grants that were offered through the Department of Justice and second,
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the National All Schedules Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER) Act of
2005, which offers grants through the Department of Health and Human
Services.35 The NASPER and Harold Rogers grant programs promote slightly
different missions. The NASPER program initiative originally intended to promote
uniform security requirements, state interoperability, and nationwide database
access to approved users, but has since restructured funding incentives to deemphasize the original initiatives.5,26 NASPER grants for state PDMPs to start-up
or expand existing programs now operate alongside the earlier federal program,
the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring Program, which offers grant funding
for state PDMPs with fewer requirements.32 NASPER was extended through
2015 and states continue to receive NASPER grants ranging from about $50K$350K to either implement or upgrade state PDMPs, but variations in program
design are now permitted. This relaxation of NASPER requirements has resulted
in the implementation of state programs that have few mechanisms for interstate
information exchange, though the earlier Harold Rogers grant-funded programs
rarely built-in these mechanisms either.35

Evidence for PDMP Efficacy
Kentucky’s PDMP, the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic
Reporting Program (KASPER), was implemented in 1999 and converted to an
electronically based reporting system in 2005. KASPER is widely regarded as the
prime example of a successful PDMP and health agencies and health
professionals continue to advocate for KASPER to remain the national model
program.31 Comprehensive evaluations of PDMPs have been rare and so a

12

variety of methods have been used to approximate different facets of PDMP
effectiveness and success.
The GAO chose to examine KASPER as a case study to measure the
effectiveness of PDMPs in a 2002 evaluation report by counting the average
number of days it took law enforcement officials in Kentucky to complete
investigations of doctor shopping before and after the implementation of
KASPER. The reduction in days to investigation completion dropped from 156
days

before

KASPER

was

implemented

to

16

days

after

KASPER

implementation. These findings were used as evidence to support the claim that
states with PDMPs are successful at reducing drug diversion.32,36
Though a wide variety of methods have been used to evaluate PDMP
effectiveness, most fall into a few broad categories: tracking prescribing trends,
health outcomes and mortality studies, and perceptions of efficacy studies.
These categories of PDMP studies will be examined in detail in the sections that
follow.

Tracking Prescribing Trends
PDMP data can be used to track prescribing and dispensing patterns
across a state. Massachusetts PDMP data collected between the years of 1996
through 2006 was used to monitor trends in dispensing patterns and doctor
shopping. Though less than 1 percent of individuals were found to be engaging in
doctor shopping, defined here as using services from 4 or more prescribers and
4 or more pharmacies over the course of one year, those individuals accounted
for 3.1 percent of all prescriptions for Schedule II opioids.37 Studies that track
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trends in prescribing to identify doctor shopping have the significant limitation of
not having a standard definition of doctor shopping to refer to, and so the
differences in definitions will influence prevalence estimates.
Evidence from a 2007 study of California PDMP data found that 12.8
percent of patients prescribed opioid controlled substances were potentially
engaging in doctor shopping, which is defined in this study as receiving the same
prescription from two or more prescribers and filling them at two or more
pharmacies within a 30 day period.28 Again, this piece highlights the need for a
standardized definition of doctor shopping because these trend estimates are not
comparable with those of other studies using different measurement parameters.
Neither doctor shopping trend study measured prescriber or dispenser use of the
PDMP nor did they attempt to measure a relationship between PDMP usage and
doctor shopping trends. Continued tracking of California PDMP data after minor
regulatory changes (moving from triplicate prescription forms to security
prescription forms in 2005) revealed that the policy change was correlated with
an increase in doctor shopping behaviors for opioid Schedule II controlled
substances over time.38 These trends conflict with evidence from other PDMPs
about possible substitution effects that would have predicted a decrease in
Schedule II opioid controlled substance prescriptions and an increase in
Schedule III opioid controlled substance prescriptions. Schedule III opioid
controlled substances were not tracked in this particular analysis and so
speculation about substitution effects is not possible. The California study also
points out that variability in program design may have significant impacts on the
behavior of prescribers.
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A study by Han et al. (2012) sought to explore what characteristics of a
consumer and county could be related to doctor shopping in an analysis that
loosely defined doctor shopping as receiving an opioid prescription from multiple
prescribers and pharmacies during 2006.39 Younger, female patients who
obtained prescriptions for Schedule III opioids in counties with high prescriber
availability and lower median income were found to be the most likely candidates
for obtaining opioid prescriptions from multiple providers. It should be noted that
this study fails to rule out the low likelihood of “malicious” intent doctor shopping
incidents because all patients with more than one prescription from a second
provider are assumed doctor shoppers, when in reality this may reflect the
disjointed care provided by specialists and primary providers in our healthcare
system rather than an intention to seek opioids for abuse.
A 2010 study measured the impact of Ohio’s PDMP using a combination
of physician surveys and observations as well as medical record review. The
primary outcome of this study was to determine if emergency department
physicians changed their initial treatment plan after viewing a patient’s controlled
substance history report. It was found that 41 percent of treatment management
plans were changed after the prescriber saw a report and 61 percent of those
changed resulted in fewer or no opioid medications being prescribed to the
patient being treated.40 Unfortunately, this study examined a small group of
patients (n=179) treated by an even smaller group of physicians (n~4) and
restricted the observations to exclude acute pain conditions. Physicians being
prompted via survey about their anticipated use of a patient PDMP report may
have unduly influenced their decision to order a report, particularly since the lead
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author of the piece himself treated approximately one-third of the sample patients
included in the study.
A simple comparison of trends in nationwide prescription claims data
revealed that counties located in states with PDMPs have lower overall insurance
claims for opioid analgesics, though it is unclear if the PDMP is the cause of
lowered claims or if that is even a desirable outcome. 41 It is also unknown
whether the observed reduction in claims for opioids reflects a reduction in
treatments for legitimate medical need or reduction in illicit use. Tracking
prescription trends provides useful information about patterns of prescription drug
use over time, but these studies do not offer much in the way of determining
PDMP effectiveness.

Health Outcomes Studies
An intuitive approach for measuring the efficacy of PDMPs is to look at
health outcomes data in states with and without the programs. Because state
PDMP data is limited to prescribing history and not complete medical history,
other means of measuring health outcomes have been used to estimate PDMP
influence. Two health outcomes that are tracked at the national level with publicly
available data sources are substance abuse treatment admissions and drug
overdose mortality. Researchers have taken advantage of this data availability
and most PDMP evaluations that take a health outcomes approach define either
overdose mortality or substance abuse treatment data to be the primary indicator
of PDMP effectiveness.
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A comparison between states with and without PDMPs found that
substance abuse patients in states with PDMPs were less likely to seek
substance abuse treatment for prescription opioid abuse than patients seeking
substance abuse treatment in states without PDMPs (OR=0.775, 95% CI 0.7640.785).42 Another study examining substance abuse treatment admissions
yielded similar results, finding that the presence of proactive state PDMPs led to
a reduced supply of Schedule II controlled substances and a lower likelihood of
substance abuse treatment admission due to prescription drug abuse. 11 Both of
these pieces surmise that the reduction in Schedule II controlled substance
availability was the likely reason for the decreased odds of opioid treatment
admissions.
Prescription drug overdoses disproportionately affect men, middle-aged
adults, and persons who identify as white/Caucasian and American Indian or
Native American.43 Residents of rural counties are nearly twice as likely to
overdose on prescription drugs as urban residents.43 Several studies have been
conducted using mortality from prescription drug overdose as the determinant of
PDMP efficacy. For example, an in-depth examination of West Virginia
prescription drug overdose deaths in 2006 found that 93.2 percent of fatalities
were caused in total or in part by opioid analgesics.44 This study used a
combination of PDMP data, law enforcement data, and records of death to
determine that men who died as a result of overdose were more likely to have
obtained prescription opioids via diversion whereas women were more likely to
have obtained prescription opioids via doctor shopping, which they defined as
receiving prescriptions for controlled substances from five or more health care
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practitioners in a year. Though this study does not claim to evaluate PDMPs
directly, this was one of the first uses of PDMP data to track and measure doctor
shopping outside of the context of law enforcement.
More recent analyses of mortality data have taken different approaches. A
2010 study provided an in-depth case study comparison between Pennsylvania
and New York drug overdose mortality rates between the years of 1994 and
2006.45 The authors offered the differences in the state PDMP characteristics as
a plausible explanation for Pennsylvania’s much larger opioid consumption and
drug overdose mortality rates. New York uses tamper-resistant prescription pads
and has a dedicated staff for monitoring suspicious activity, whereas
Pennsylvania does not have these PDMP program features. Though the
differences in population distribution between urban and rural residents are
noted, this is not offered as a possible explanation for the disparities between the
two states’ overdose mortalities. Pennsylvania’s population is substantially more
rural (50 percent) than New York’s (25 percent) and according to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, rural residents are statistically significantly more
likely to die of prescription drug overdoses than urban residents. 43 Future
research comparing mortality data across states should factor in this key
difference in state characteristics or should construct a model of state fixed
effects.
Paulozzi and colleagues expanded upon the methods for investigating
prescription overdose mortality by developing a research design that allowed for
empirical comparisons between all states. Specifically, the effects of PDMPs on
opioid overdose-related mortality and overall opioid consumption were measured
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using a combination of data from PDMPs, mortality data from all 50 states and
the District of Columbia, and publicly available data on prescription drug sales for
1999 through 2005.34 It was found that states with PDMPs did not have
significantly lower rates of opioid overdose mortality, even when controlling for
states with proactive PDMP reports versus retroactive PDMP reports. Despite
carefully controlling for geographic proximity between states with and without
PDMPs, this study failed to control for the variability in other program design
features.
Green and colleagues take issue with Paulozzi and colleagues’ analysis of
one element in program variability across states; specifically, they point out that
differences in health care practitioner access to PDMP reports are not
addressed.46 Green and colleagues contend that five of the nineteen state
PDMPs examined by Paulozzi and colleagues prohibit health care practitioner
access to PDMP reports and another six states do not require any health care
practitioner participation. Several of the remaining states in the original analysis
report low utilization of PDMPs from health care practitioners, so the evidence
presented that established a link between PDMPs and overdoses is weak.
Kerlikowskie echoes criticisms of the lack of provider utilization data in Paulozzi
and colleagues’ analysis, but also points out that NASPER funding and electronic
system upgrades represent major improvements in PDMP capabilities as tools
for clinicians.47
Neither criticism offers suggestions for alternative model specifications,
but a natural next step for improving Paulozzi’s research design could be to
compare the overdose mortality rates at smaller units of analysis. An analysis of
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PDMP use by practitioners at the county level may help tease out the effects on
overdose mortality rates in counties where the practitioner PDMP utilization is
high versus counties with similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
where practitioner PDMP use is low, assuming it is possible to convince state
PDMPs to share practitioner utilization data.
An innovative approach to identifying PDMP effect on opioid overdose
was taken by Reifler et al. (2012) by utilizing Poison Control Center call data that
identified intentional and unintentional opioid exposures by consumers, rather
than mortality data.15 Reifler attempted to analyze differences in PDMP
regulatory features by constructing indicators for “superior” and “standard”
PDMPs, where superior PDMPs were defined as monitoring Schedule II-IV
substances and duration of implementation since 2002. She concluded that
PDMPs effectively reduced intentional opioid exposures (0.2 percent versus 1.9
percent total exposures by quarter for states with/without PDMP, p=0.036);
however, the characterization of PDMPs as superior or standard failed to
generate evidence of an influence of these programmatic features on Poison
Control Center call volume or on substance abuse treatment admissions.
Survey Studies: Perceptions of Efficacy
Some states do not require prescriber participation in PDMPs and therefor
many physicians may be unaware of the programs or how to use them,
according to surveys conducted in Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio. 8-10 Feldman and
colleague’s survey study of Ohio physicians found that 84 percent of physicians
were aware of Ohio’s PDMP, but only 58.8 percent of physicians had ever used
the database five years after the program had been implemented. 9 Of those
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physicians who reported using Ohio’s PDMP, 93.6 percent had altered their
prescribing behavior as a result of viewing a patient report. This study only looks
at physicians working in a single academic medical center in Ohio, so the results
reflect the perceptions and opinions of physicians in a narrow context.
Ohio pharmacists expressed usage similar to that of physicians for their
state PDMP. About 62 percent of Ohio community pharmacists who participated
in a survey in 2010 reported that they used their state PDMP (n=1,434). 48 Among
those who did not use the PDMP, their primary reasons for not doing so included
a lack of Internet access, slow reporting times, and time to register for the PDMP.
Pharmacists that had received information about the PDMP from continuing
education training were more likely to be registered users of the PDMP than
pharmacists who had not received information. The Ohio studies point to an
important lesson for states implementing PDMPs: it is difficult (and perhaps not
worthwhile) to measure PDMP effectiveness if the intended primary users,
physicians and pharmacists, are not using the program.
The evaluation of Kentucky’s PDMP included an analysis of prescriber,
pharmacist, and law enforcement perceptions of PDMP effectiveness. 10 All three
groups report overwhelming agreement that Kentucky’s PDMP is effective at
reducing prescription drug abuse and diversion: prescribers-95.8 percent,
pharmacists-92.8 percent, and law enforcement officials- 93.1 percent. While
law enforcement officials and pharmacists report a high degree of usage of the
PDMP, 64.0 percent of controlled substance prescribers in Kentucky did not have
a registered KASPER account at the time of program evaluation. A related study
has examined the perception of KASPER from the Medicaid consumer/patient
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perspective.49 It was found that Medicaid patients are generally unaware of
KASPER, but patients diagnosed with chronic pain conditions are more likely to
report that a physician discussed their KASPER report with them than patients
that have not been diagnosed with chronic pain conditions. Chronic pain patients
were also more likely to report trouble getting a prescription for controlled
substances, but not significantly more likely to experience problems filling a
prescription at a pharmacy.
The Wisconsin Pain and Policy Studies Group developed a state PDMP
and pain treatment evaluation method that grades individual state programs from
A to F based solely upon the language contained in state regulations.22 Report
cards are released every three years, beginning in 2000, and states are assigned
grades based upon how well their regulations adhere to the Principle of Balance
by providing medically current definitions for treatments and disease states, while
avoiding prohibitive

limits on medical practitioners’ discretion to

write

prescriptions for controlled substances. This report card approach addresses
potential conflicts in the language of state regulations, but does not serve to
evaluate the performance of the PDMPs in a direct, empirical way.
Gaps in the Research
Fishman recommends aggregating data from multiple state PDMPs to
analyze health outcomes, but cautions that the variability in program regulations
and operations would make any analysis of current program data unlikely to pick
up on the successful attributes of a program.12 This incompatibility between state
program measures could be ameliorated if states were to agree on a nationwide
list of controlled substances to monitor via their PDMPs and move towards
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adopting more similar program features. The failure of NASPER to require state
interoperability is quite the hindrance to measuring national PDMP effectiveness.
A significant proportion of the studies examined in this paper use the
Department of Justice’s Automation of Reports and Consolidated Order System
(ARCOS) data to track controlled substance sales and the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration’s Treatment Episode Datasets (TEDS) to
track substance abuse treatment. These two data sources present researchers
with several limitations.

For example, ARCOS data does not provide any

evidence of illicit drug purchasing or licit interstate purchasing that individuals
transport across borders. The ARCOS data is also unable to capture the specific
intended indication for each dispensed drug. 50 Substance abuse treatment
admissions data (TEDS) is limited in capturing only those individuals who choose
to seek inpatient treatment for substance abuse in facilities that receive at least
some public funding.51 States with higher poverty rates may not have their
substance abuse populations adequately represented if a smaller proportion of
individuals with substance abuse problems from those states seek inpatient
treatment. Variation in state drug court policies may also impact court-ordered
substance abuse treatment admissions.
Brushwood points out that previous methods of determining PDMP
efficacy largely focus on reducing drug diversion and pay little heed to
determining whether PDMPs have an impact on reducing drug abuse. 13 Drug
abuse, in itself a concept difficult to measure, has often been operationalized as
drug overdose deaths or treatment sought for overdose. Limitations associated
with using these particular outcomes as the indicator for effectiveness have
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already been discussed and it is clear that researchers are in need of more
comprehensively defined, standard indicators of health outcomes in order to
evaluate PDMPs using these methods.
Healthcare providers and the public have expressed skepticism that
PDMPs are effective tools for reducing drug abuse and diversion due to
perceived doctor shopping in areas bordering states that do not have PDMPs. 23
Law enforcement agencies, however, cite evidence of increased prosecutions for
criminal offenses of diversion and doctor shopping in states that have PDMPs to
argue that state border trafficking is not a significant weakness of PDMPs.52 Law
enforcement agencies have more resources to build cases when using PDMP
data, but interstate exchange of PDMP data is still limited. The capability to
exchange information with other state health providers should be incorporated
into future evaluations of PDMP efficacy.
Unintended Consequences
The implementation of PDMPs may lead to unintended consequences.
The unintended consequence that has drawn the most concern from
communities of health professionals is the phenomenon known as the “chilling
effect”, which is the change in prescriber treatment practices as a response to a
perceived

threat

of

prosecution

or

investigation.10

Another

unintended

consequence, the possibility of a substitution effect of lower Scheduled controlled
substances for higher Scheduled controlled substances, was unanticipated
before program implementation but may be related to the chilling effect. What
follows is a discussion of the evidence collected thus far about both of these
consequences of PDMP implementation.
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Chilling Effect Evidence
Physicians and physician interest groups in states that implement PDMPs
have sometimes expressed concerns that their medically legitimate treatment of
patients with chronic pain conditions will be flagged in electronic systems that
monitor prescribing patterns.53 Some academicians and health care providers
have criticized law enforcement organizations like the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) of being overtly dismissive of the possibility that PDMPs cause a barrier to
access. One paper accuses the DEA as responding “…with sarcasm to the
suggestion of a chilling effect...referring with disbelief to what it describes as the
’alleged’ chilling effect.”13
The majority of research conducted with the explicit intent of measuring a
chilling effect associated with PDMP implementation has been survey studies.
Physicians in several states have been asked about their actual prescribing
habits as well as their perceptions of PDMP influence on those habits. Survey
questions about regulatory pressures reveal that physicians in various specialties
from across the United States are fairly unconcerned with pressure to prescribe
fewer opioids for chronic pain treatment, though physicians in states with PDMPlike programs expressed greater comfort with prescribing opioids long term.54 A
survey of Ohio physicians is in agreement with these national survey results, as
30 percent report feeling less concerned about prescribing controlled substances
as a result of viewing patient reports, and a few of these physicians (14 percent)
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expressed feeling more comfortable increasing the quantity prescribed after
viewing a patient’s report.9
A survey of physician attitudes of Virginia’s PDMP found that a small
minority of physicians (about 5 percent) reported a decreased ability to treat
chronic pain due to the implementation of a PDMP. However, more physicians
(about 36 percent) reported a general decrease in prescribing of controlled
substances for other reasons, such as media attention and increased law
enforcement actions.8 This piece surveyed a small group of Virginia physicians
about initial perceptions of the PDMP and because more than half of the survey
sample (52 percent) had never heard of the PDMP before receiving the survey, a
follow-up study to report any changes in perception or use would be useful.
Interestingly, while the consensus from these prescriber survey studies is that
prescribers like having access to the PDMP data about their patients, there is not
much enthusiasm reported by prescribers for confronting a patient when the data
indicates cause for concern.55
Fass and Hardigan contend that pharmacists are the health care providers
most affected by the implementation of PDMPs, due to the required reporting of
controlled substance dispensing by pharmacists. Their survey of Florida
pharmacists conducted in the months immediately prior to the implementation of
Florida’s much-anticipated PDMP found that pharmacists across all practice
settings (hospital, independent, chain, or other type of pharmacy) generally
disagree with the notion that a PDMP will discourage or prevent them from
dispensing controlled substances (total n=836, 59.0 percent).56 In this survey
study, pharmacists also expressed strong support of PDMP implementation (78.6

26

percent) and, on average, disagreed with statements expressing concerns that a
PDMP is an invasion of patient privacy (73.6 percent).
Substitution Effect
There is some evidence that physicians in states with PDMPs have opted
to substitute the prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances (like
oxycodone) with Schedule III drugs such as hydrocodone.

Analysis of

prescription drug shipments using the Automation of Reports and Consolidated
Order Systems (ARCOS) database, revealed that states with PDMPs received
fewer shipments of oxycodone but received shipments of hydrocodone at an
increasing rate from 1997 to 2003.42 ARCOS data also indicates that states
without PDMPs experienced the opposite trend during this time- an increasing
rate of oxycodone shipments and a decreasing rate of hydrocodone shipments.
Substitution of a higher Scheduled drug for a lower Scheduled drug has not been
put forward as evidence for the chilling effect, but it certainly represents a change
in prescriber behavior. Further analysis of ARCOS data through 2006 indicates a
continuation in the trend that the substitution effect between Scheduled II
controlled substances for Schedule II controlled substances of opioid pain
relievers continues to occur in states with PDMPs.57
Other types of controlled substances have been shown to experience
similar decreases in use in states with PDMPs. A study comparing New York
and New Jersey’s Medicaid utilization of benzodiazepines after New York
implemented a triplicate prescription program indicated that the program
implementation was correlated with a significant decrease in benzodiazepine
use.58 In this particular study, possible benzodiazepine substitutes did not
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experience statistically significant increases in utilization, but benzodiazepine
substitutes were narrowly defined.
Conclusion
In 2006, Manchikanti described state PDMPs as failures for overemphasizing law enforcement goals while neglecting to include more proactive
tools that would give health providers the information necessary to make clinical
decisions to reduce doctor shopping and diversion. 5 He also points out that the
highly variable program design across states has slowed the already flagging
NASPER initiative, whose budget restrictions and reprioritizations have
contributed to the sluggish development of an interoperable system across
states.5,31 These allegations of over-emphasis on law enforcement activities may
ring true: chronic pain conditions continue to be under-treated. Estimates of the
annual cost of chronic pain conditions in the United States range from $100
billion to $635 billion in treatments and lost productivity, due to the persistent
under-treatment of these conditions.17,18
A visual comparison of opioid substance abuse treatment admission
trends by state, between the year 2000 and 2010 can be found in Appendix B.
These trends map national TEDS data and show that, despite the
implementation of PDMPs, the abuse of controlled substances (and opioids in
particular) is still on the rise, but PDMPs may have slowed the rate of these
increasing opioid abuse and diversion trends. The available literature is currently
unable to provide a definitive answer, but emerging program evaluations are
providing states with evidence that will be useful in making program design
decisions.
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CHAPTER TWO
Policy Variation in Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Across States:
A Policy Solution to an Information Asymmetry Problem
Chapter Summary: The objective of this chapter is to identify an appropriate theoretical
framework to operationalize PDMP policy variation across states. The research design included
an analysis of state-level regulatory and PDMP program variation, and exploration of a theoretical
framework using evidence from policy implementation and economics literature to explain the
process of PDMP feature diffusion across states and their projected variable outcome on PDMP
effectiveness. This process informed the operationalization of independent variables and
covariates employed throughout the following empirical chapters, which are defined and justified
here. It is hypothesized that certain PDMP program features and regulations (e.g., mandatory
prescriber registration, required inclusion of Schedule III and Schedule IV controlled substance
reporting) have greater impact on the efficacy of PDMPs than other program features and
regulations.

The public health and public safety crises associated with the abuse and
diversion of certain prescription drugs, known as controlled substances, may best
be framed as a problem of information asymmetry. State Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) have been implemented by most states to correct
the information asymmetry problem by maintaining databases of consumer
controlled substance prescribing and dispensing information. PDMPs as a policy
solution address asymmetric information across multiple parties: between the
consumers and prescribers/dispensers of controlled substances, between the
regulatory agents (such as licensing boards) and prescribers/dispensers of
controlled substances, and between the consumers and law enforcement agents.
The official objectives of state PDMPs are stated similarly: to reduce drug
abuse and diversion while maintaining access to controlled substances in the
case of legitimate medical need. The means to those ends, however, varies
across states in terms of policy structure as well as in implementation strategy.
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PDMP Adoption Varies Due to Funding Streams and Focusing Events
The two federal funding sources that incentivize state PDMP adoption are
the Harold Rogers grant and the National Association for State Prescription
Electronic Reporting (NASPER). Both of these grant programs require states to
adopt certain PDMP program characteristics in exchange for funding, but the
scope and stated mission for these grant programs differ. NASPER, which was
adopted as federal law in 2005 and modeled after Kentucky’s state PDMP,
initially required state PDMPs to adopt programs that would be interoperable and
standardized to promote interstate exchange of PDMP information.26
The NASPER program’s mission is to identify patients at risk for abuse
and is administered via the Department of Health and Human Services, whereas
the older (2002) Harold Rogers program offers smaller “no strings attached”
grants in order to encourage states to address drug abuse and diversion
problems at the first warning signs of prescription drug abuse epidemics. 32 The
NASPER program characteristic requirements are slightly less restrictive than the
Department of Justice-operated Harold Rogers program, whose stated
requirements include contingencies upon grant acceptance that permit law
enforcement agents and officials at the local, state, and the federal government
level access to state PDMP data during investigations.35
California’s 1939 PDMP was the policy innovator, but most states did not
adopt PDMP-type monitoring policies until the 1990s/2000s. The sudden spike in
policy adoption likely occurred as a response to public attention and concern
about the rise in public health and legal problems related to prescription drug
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abuse. A singular “focusing event”, which can be described as a dramatic and
sudden issue (e.g., a natural disaster) that captivates immediate public
attention,59,60 is unlikely to be pinpointed for drawing public attention to
prescription drug abuse problems. However, a surge of abuse resulting in
deaths, addiction, and incarcerations that arose in rural areas in the late 1990s
and early 2000s and quickly spread throughout the United States was the likely
impetus for the opening of a policy window. It is also possible that high-profile
celebrity deaths due to prescription drug overdose during this time contributed to
this sustained wave of focus that captured the attention of the public.
The flood of policy adopters in the 1990s/2000s was followed by a handful
of “laggards” who have mostly adopted, but have yet to implement, a PDMP. This
implementation pattern illustrates the 5-stage model of diffusion as described by
Rogers (1995) very well.61 Figure 2.1 below shows the bell-curve implementation
by each wave, classified by time of implementation.
Figure 2.1 The Diffusion of State PDMP Policies, 1939-2013
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Variations in PDMP Policy Features
One policy variation often invoked in PDMP evaluations across states is
the authorities in which state PDMPs are housed. Several states house PDMP
programs within Departments of Health and Human Services or health provider
licensing agencies that focus on a public health mission, whereas other states
house PDMP programs within law enforcement agencies, which tend to
emphasize the goal of reducing prescription drug diversion. PDMP evaluations
and studies have failed to produce evidence that this particular attribute has lead
to differences in outcomes and program effectiveness. For this reason, a variable
for housing authority was not operationalized.
Another policy variation is the classification of controlled substances into
Schedules by some state authorities that compete with the federal drug Schedule
classification system. Conflicting state and federal Scheduling classifications may
be a regulatory challenge for developing a national model for PDMP regulations
in regards to a handful of substances. For example, Mississippi classifies
pseudoephedrine, which is a precursor substance in the illicit production of
methamphetamine,

as

a

Schedule

III

controlled

substance 62

but

pseudoephedrine is not Scheduled as a controlled substance at the federal level.
Most PDMPs require the dispenser of controlled substances, typically a
pharmacist, to submit a record of that activity to the PDMP within a defined
timeframe. In early PDMPs the timeframe was established as monthly, biweekly,
or weekly, but current trends in PDMP regulatory change have shifted data
transmission times closer to the time of transaction between pharmacy and
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consumer. Significant policy variation then occurs with what state programs
choose to do with the data that had been transmitted from pharmacies
(dispensers) to the PDMP database. Some states, for example, have enacted
compulsory program registration of dispensers and prescribers of controlled
substances. Others require participation on the part of the dispenser, but not the
prescriber, and the latest trend diffusing across state PDMPs is mandating
PDMP use by prescribers for defined circumstances before a controlled
substance prescription can be written.
States with proactive PDMPs send unsolicited reports of controlled
substance use histories to prescribers, dispensers, and/or law enforcement
officials, while other states require all or some of these users to request a report
for each individual patient.29 The proactive reports, however, vary considerably in
content by state as well as which PDMP user (or groups of PDMP users) receive
the reports. There is some evidence to suggest that pharmacists are more likely
to view their PDMP user role as limited to the providers of data, leaving the
treatment decisions involving data found in a patient’s PDMP report to
prescribers.
Most states that have adopted PDMPs grant law enforcement agencies
access to PDMP data, but the extent of that access varies substantially across
states. Registered law enforcement officials in most states with PDMPs have
access to trend analysis of controlled substance prescribing and dispensing. The
variation occurs in how a state handles access to an individual’s controlled
substance prescription history. Some states require warrants, court orders, or
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subpoenas before law enforcement is granted access to an individual’s controlled
substance history,29 while other states allow more permissive access by law
enforcement. Federal agencies, namely the DEA, cite precedent of related health
data regulations that permit them to access data if pursuing an active
investigation. These regulations have recently caused legal conflicts between
state PDMPs with more restrictive patient privacy protections and the DEA. 63
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the key policy variations in state PDMPs
discussed above. Data was acquired from state statutes or codified laws and
represents the frequency of PDMP characteristics as they were in December
2013.
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Table 2.1 Summary of Variations in State PDMP Policies* as of 2013
Policy
Housing Agency
Proactive Reporting

Law Enforcement Access to
Reports
Compulsory Registration
Dispenser Reporting
Frequency
Interstate Data Sharing
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Schedules Monitored

Policy Characteristics (n = number of states)
Law Enforcement Agency
Other Agency (5)
(6)
Yes, to medical providers and
Yes, to medical providers
Yes, to law and
law agencies (27)
only (7)
regulatory
agencies only (8)
Yes, with search warrant or
Yes, under restricted
No access (1)
active investigation (46)
circumstances (2)
Prescribers and Dispensers
Prescribers Only (2)
Not Compulsory
(13)
(34)
Daily or more frequently (8)
From 2 to 7 days (33)
Bi-weekly or less
frequently (7)
Sharing with other PDMPs and Sharing with users in other Sharing with other
users in other states (18)
states only (8)
PDMPs only (18)
Required access under certain Access never required
No legislation (1)
circumstances (14)
(35)
II only, or II and III only (4)
II through IV only (16)
II through V (29)
Public Health Agency (38)

*Data obtained from each state’s PDMP statutes and regulations.
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No legislation (1)
No, no proactive
reporting or no
legislation (8)
No legislation (1)
No legislation (1)
Not specified or no
legislation (2)
No sharing or no
legislation (6)

No legislation (1)

Operationalizing and Defining PDMP Independent Variables
Table 2.2 provides the list of PDMP features operationalized as indicator
variables that will be employed throughout the empirical analyses in the following
chapters as independent variables. The presence of an operational PDMP has
been defined in previous literature as the year or date of implementation. The
simplicity of that definition, though appealing, was found to be lacking an
important caveat: PDMPs that have been categorized in previous literature as
operational were in many instances collecting data but were unable to provide
their authorized users access to that data. In one state, there was found to be a
gap of six years between the traditionally defined ‘operational’ time (where the
PDMP

was receiving

data

transmissions

and had

developed

storage

architecture) but was not providing reports to users. This change in variable
definition represents a substantial departure from previous PDMP evaluations.
Next, it was determined that the two primary user groups of PDMP reports
should receive their own indicator variables for the presence of proactive
reporting. States that transmit patient controlled substance history records to
prescribers and/or law enforcement officials are classified as proactive states.
Previous PDMP studies have required that both of these groups or other groups
(such as licensing boards and pharmacists) also receive unsolicited reporting to
qualify as proactive. This new definition allows for more specificity of report use
because prescribers and law enforcement officials utilize the PDMP data with
different missions in mind. This definition is more permissive of variation in state
policy, which can be seen in the exclusion of several states in previous
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definitions of proactive in the literature because those states only send proactive
reports to law enforcement officials.
The law enforcement access variable is defined in this series of projects
as states that provide records to law enforcement agencies and officials pursuant
to any active investigation. This means that states that require warrants, court
orders, or subpoenas before PDMP report transmission are not classified as
having open law enforcement access by this definition. This topic is a recent
point of concern and so has not been explored in other PDMP studies.
States have only recently begun moving towards compulsory registration
with the PDMP and compulsory prescriber use of PDMP data and so other
PDMP studies have not incorporated these definitions into their PDMP descriptor
variables. Eventually, further expansion of this variable definition will be
necessary because enough states will have passed compulsory prescriber use
mandates. Expansions of the definition will need to distinguish between states
that require use in all primary care controlled substance prescription writing
situations, states that limit required use to timed intervals, and states that further
limit required use to specialist care. At the time of this project, few states had any
compulsory prescriber use mandates so all variations of this policy were defined
as meeting the criteria for compulsory prescriber use when coding variables.
Previous PDMP studies that control for a state’s ability to share data with
other PDMPs have generously defined interoperability as states that have the
authority and willingness to share interstate data, but this project narrows the
scope of the variable definition to those states that actively transmit across state

37

lines. It should be noted that functional interstate sharing will likely increase now
that formal efforts have been undertaken to centralize data-sharing.64
The variable for frequent data transmission from pharmacies to PDMPs is
defined as states that require the uploading of dispensing data in less than one
week after the dispensing event. Data transmission frequency has not been used
as a variable in many PDMP evaluations. The Schedules monitored by the state
PDMP are often used in PDMP evaluations and so are included as individual
indicator variables in these analyses. It should be noted that federal Scheduling
is assumed in these variable definitions of “Schedules monitored.”
Table 2.2 PDMP Features Variables, Derived from Review of PDMP Documentation
PDMP Variable
Operational PDMP

Proactive PDMP:
Prescribers
Proactive PDMP: Law
Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Pharmacy Transmission
Frequency: <1 Week
Schedule II Monitored
Schedule III Monitored

Description
The state has implemented a PDMP AND its data are
accessible to approved users (prescribers, pharmacists, or law
enforcement agents)
Unsolicited patient controlled substance history reports are
generated and transmitted to prescribers
Unsolicited patient controlled substance history reports OR
prescriber/dispensing history are generated and transmitted to
law enforcement agents
The state PDMP records are accessible to registered law
enforcement agents without a warrant, court order, or subpoena
The state requires that prescribers and pharmacists register with
the PDMP
The state requires that prescribers access patient PDMP
records at some defined interval or at the point-of-care
The state has the authority to AND actively transmits data to
other state PDMPs and/or authorized users in other states
The state requires all pharmacies to transmit controlled
substance dispensing records to the PDMP at least once per
week or more frequently
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and
dispensing of Schedule II controlled substances
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and
dispensing of Schedule III controlled substances
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Table 2.2 continued, PDMP Features Variables, Derived from Review of PDMP
Documentation
PDMP Variable
Schedule IV Monitored
Schedule V Monitored
Unscheduled Substances
Monitored

Description
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and
dispensing of Schedule IV controlled substances
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and
dispensing of Schedule V controlled substances
The state uses the PDMP to monitor the prescribing and
dispensing
of
non-controlled
substances
(e.g.,
pseudoephedrine)

Implications of PDMP Regulatory Variation
While several states currently require certain groups (typically prescribers
and dispensers) to register with the PDMP, very few states currently require use
of the PDMP data in prescribing or for treatment decisions.65 Compulsory use of
the PDMP may force non-governmental actors, such as healthcare providers, to
take on the role of a street-level administrator of policy (i.e., substitute “policing”
of abuse and diversion in the absence of a law enforcement investigation). This
new role of the provider may be uncomfortable for both providers and consumers
and may decrease consumer confidence and trust in providers, which could
result in worsened health outcomes for consumers who reluctantly share
information with their provider.
The variation in state PDMP housing authority also has interesting
implications about the tacit approval to grant power to non-elected bureaucratic
agencies that, in effect, create policy. These implications are particularly
noticeable when PDMPs are housed by auxiliary government agencies, such as
professional licensing boards, which have limited public input and operational
transparency but have the ability to impose binding regulations on licensees that
influence the availability of treatment options to the public. The phenomenon of
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policy-making bureaucratic agencies has been referred to as the “4th branch of
government”66 and it is unclear whether this policy-making role is appropriate for
these agencies due to limited opportunities to incorporate the checks and
balances built in to the primary branches of government.
State level agencies that operate PDMPs may also be susceptible to
external political influences. Brudney and Herbert (1987) examined external
political influence on a collection of agencies at the state level and found that
unlike federal agencies, clientele groups and professional associations were
found to have (overall) less significant influence on state agencies than the
governor and the state legislature.67 Influence on state agencies was measured
by surveying agency heads directly and the self-report nature of this measure is
potentially problematic. It may behoove agency heads to under-report influence
from external interest groups, by intention or by genuine inability to estimate their
influence. This is particularly concerning in the case of PDMPs because
Congressional staff self-report that the pharmaceutical industry’s most prominent
lobbying force, PhRMA, is the most influential interest group in health policy.68
Later analyses of political actor influence on agencies conceptualized
influence in a more objective fashion, by measuring quantifiable federal agency
outputs. Congress, the president, and other political actors may exert political
influence on the bureaucracy using more indirect means. Balla and Wright (2001)
explored one of these other avenues of political control: congressionally
appointed advisory committees.69 The control exerted in this case refers
specifically to the flow of information from legislation to institutions by selecting
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members to advisory committees that represent legislative interests. The case
study examined here was a prominent advisory committee to the EPA, the
National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC). They found that agency
decisions were impacted by advisory committee membership and representation
from interests. It is possible that these political influences work via similar
mechanisms at the state level. Kentucky’s PDMP Advisory Council is appointed
by the Kentucky Governor and other state PDMP advisory council’s or
committee’s are appointed by each respective state’s Governor or by a
member(s) of state legislature.70
Policy-makers have been criticized for avoiding evidence-based decision
making approaches similar to those that health care practitioners advocate when
evaluating new policies,71 but these criticisms ignore the myriad constraints of
political influences operating on policy-makers as well as the process by which
problems demand attention through policy intervention. Balla points out that
professional organizations have an important role to play in the diffusion of
health-related policies72 and the deferral of state PDMP requirements to
regulation by licensing boards rather than by statute speak to the importance of
this role (e.g., compulsory use of Kentucky’s PDMP by prescribers in certain
circumstances is regulated and enforced by professional licensing boards and is
not explicitly mentioned in statute). These professional organizations, which are
interest groups better poised to influence policy development with licensing
boards for their respective professions68 than the state level PDMP, should not
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be overlooked as likely having significant influence in the development of state
PDMP regulations.
Conclusion
State PDMPs present a policy solution to the asymmetric information
problem grappled with by prescribers and dispensers of controlled substances,
but the blurring of realms between law enforcement and health care raises
questions about the implications of further policy interventions in medical
practice. The variation that arose in state PDMP policies may be attributed to a
variety of factors, many of which are described in this piece, and can partially
explain the observed differences in the impacts of these policies on several key
program outcomes such as,
1) Prescriber and dispenser behaviors;
2) Law enforcement activities;
3) Consumer behaviors and outcomes related to controlled substance
consumption; and,
4) Reimbursement policies of controlled substances by publicly funded
health insurance programs (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare).
Several of these outcomes will be examined empirically in the following chapters,
the next of which utilizes state Medicaid prescription drug data to measure
changes in quantities dispensed of selected controlled substances across states
with and without PDMPs to Medicaid beneficiaries.

42

CHAPTER THREE
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Opioid Dispensing
to Medicaid Beneficiaries
Chapter Summary: This chapter examines the relationship of PDMP presence and program
features with the marketplace for prescription drugs, particularly opioids, among state Medicaid
beneficiaries. A hypothesized “substitution effect” following the implementation of state PDMPs is
also explored in this chapter. Data for this chapter was acquired from the Medicaid Drug Rebate
Program for the years 1991-2011. The research design consists of aggregating all opioids utilized
by Medicaid patients to the state-year level, where the specific method employed was a time
series, random effects generalized least squares (GLS) random effects regression analysis. The
dependent variable is quantity of opioid substances, standardized to morphine milligram
equivalents in order to account for variation in substance quantity, dosage, and strength. The
independent variables include PDMP features as defined in Chapter 2 and year is also included
as a covariate. Supplementary analyses of benzodiazepines are also conducted.

Consumption of prescription medications for nonmedical use has
increased substantially in the last two decades and prescription medications are
now the second-most class of abused substance, after marijuana.1 Drug
overdoses overtook traffic accidents in 2009 as the number one cause of
accidental death for adults aged 25 to 64 in the United States and are the second
leading cause of accidental death among people of all ages. 73 The majority of
these drug overdose deaths (75 percent in 2010) involve the class of painrelieving medications known as opioids.74 In addition to elevated mortality risks
when compared to other drugs, opioids tend to have a high potential for abuse.
Substance abuse treatment admissions for opioids have increased substantially
in the last two decades: from less than 1 percent of total national treatment
admissions in 1993 to approximately 9 percent total national treatment
admissions in 2011 and approximately 32 percent of total treatment admissions
in Kentucky.51
The negative economic, social, and public health consequences
associated with the abuse and diversion of prescription drugs, and opioids in
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particular, have sparked the innovation and diffusion of policy solutions that
mitigate the information asymmetry problem that health providers face when
providing access to controlled substances to consumers. These policy solutions,
in the form of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), track the
prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances with the purpose of reducing
abuse and diversion23 by allowing health providers to access information about
the history of controlled substance use by individual consumers. As of 2015, 49
states and the District of Columbia have enacted PDMP legislation. Currently, 43
states have implemented this legislation and are administering operational
programs.29
Prescription medications and illicit substances that have the potential for
abuse are classified as controlled substances by the Food and Drug
Administration

and

the

Drug

Enforcement

Administration.21

Controlled

substances are classified according to the level of risk for abuse potential and
these classifications are called “Schedules,” as defined in Chapter 1. This piece
will isolate the impact of state PDMPs on the dispensing of two classes of
controlled substances in particular, opioids and benzodiazepines. Opioids and
benzodiazepines are two large families of drugs with several individual forms and
dosages that are categorized as controlled substances. Opioids, which are painrelieving drugs derived naturally or synthetically from chemical components of
opium, are of particular interest due to the high potential for abuse and overdose
as well as the most likely class of drug to be sought in instances of “doctor
shopping.”28 Opioids, when Scheduled, can be classified as Schedule II,
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Schedule III, Schedule V, or in rare cases are Unscheduled (typically cough
syrups). Benzodiazepines are a class of drugs that act as sedatives (anxiolytics)
and formulations tend to be Scheduled lower than opioid drug formulations due
to less overall abuse potential.75 All benzodiazepines are Schedule IV controlled
substances.
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is some evidence that PDMP
implementation has caused the unintended consequence of a “substitution effect”
where prescribers substitute the prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances
with prescribing of lower Scheduled substances in order to decrease abuse
potential or to decrease prescriber liability. However, these previous analyses
rely on data from the Department of Justice’s Automation of Reports and
Consolidated Order System (ARCOS), which does not have the ability to monitor
interstate purchasing or to capture the intended indication for each dispensed
drug.50
This study uses Medicaid Drug Rebate Program data as an alternative
data source to track the total quantity dispensed of certain controlled substances.
Medicaid drug rebate data compensates for the limitations of ARCOS data
because Medicaid beneficiaries must reside in the state in which the
reimbursement claim for the prescription drug is dispensed, which significantly
reduces the potential for interstate purchasing. The characteristics of this data
source will be discussed further in the Methods section.
The purpose of this study is to test the following three hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: States with operational PDMPs will have total fewer
opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed as compared to states with no
operational PDMP.



Hypothesis
enforcement

2:

Proactive

reporting,

prescriber
unfettered

reporting,
law

proactive

enforcement

law

access,

compulsory prescriber registration, compulsory prescriber use, and
monitoring of lower Scheduled substances are program characteristics
that are associated with decreased total opioid and benzodiazepine
units dispensed.


Hypothesis 3: A “substitution effect” between higher Scheduled
substances and lowered Scheduled substances occurs in states with a
PDMP.

Methods
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA) called for drug
manufacturers to agree to the creation of prescription drug rebates in exchange
for federal matching funds for state Medicaid prescription drug spending.76
Beginning in 1990, agreements are annually negotiated for each covered drug.
The reimbursement rate is typically calculated as a percentage discount from the
drug’s average retail price or as the difference between the drug’s average retail
price and the lowest wholesale price offered in a transaction in the previous year.
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program data is publicly available from the time
since the program’s inception to two years before the present and includes the
following data for each state: each drug covered in every state, the total number
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of prescriptions dispensed, the total quantity of units of each drug dispensed
(e.g., number of pills, number of liquid doses, etc.), the total dollar amount of
Medicaid reimbursement for each drug dispensed, and the total dollar amount of
reimbursement for drugs that were not eligible for Medicaid matching funds. 77
(Note: data is not available for Arizona before 2010 due to nonparticipation.) This
rebate data has been validated in the literature and is typically used to perform
state-level trend analysis of prescription drug utilization and expenditures in
Medicaid.78-82
Data files from all 50 states and the District of Columbia were webscraped and merged into a single database after being tagged with state, year,
and quarter identifiers for the years 1991 through 2011. Drugs were uniquely
identified in the data using the National Drug Code (NDC), which assigns each
drug an 11-digit number that is coded to identify the manufacturer, product,
strength, package size, and distributer of the drug.83 The total quantity of units of
each drug dispensed by state was selected as the primary outcome of interest
rather than the total number of prescriptions dispensed so that changes in the
actual quantity of each drug supplied to states could be measured. Number of
prescriptions varies by the days supply provided in the prescription (e.g., 7 days,
30 days, 60 days, etc.). Without knowing the days supply, it is difficult to
accurately

count

the

units

of

the

drug

dispensed.

Two classes of drugs, opioids and benzodiazepines, were isolated for this
analysis due to the availability of conversion factors for these classes of drugs.
Also, benzodiazepines are often implicated in adverse events when prescribed or
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used in conjunction with opioids.84 The conversion factor for opioids, known as
morphine milligram equivalents, allows for the comparison of the units of each
opioid to occur in a standardized fashion.9 Morphine milligram equivalents
(MMEs) were derived from a peer-reviewed conversion of each specific opioid
based on factors such as the route of administration, dosage form, quantity, and
strength of drug.85,86 A total of 12,050 unique opioid formulations were converted
to MMEs based upon these procedures and Table 3.1 contains a sample of
these MME conversions for selected prescription opioids.
Table 3.1 Conversion Factors for Selected Opioids to Standardized MMEs
Generic Medication
Name

National Drug
Code (NDC)

Dosage Form

Strength

10

Unit of
Dosage
Measurement
MCG/HR

MME
Conversion
Factor
42

Buprenorphine

35356060504

Hydromorphone
Hydrochloride
Methadone
Hydrochloride
Morphine Sulfate

23635040801

Patch, extended
release
Tablet, extended
release
Tablet

8

MG

4

40

MG

3

200

MG

1

10

MG

1.5

00005313123

Tablet, extended
release
Tablet, extended
release
Tablet

Oxycodone
Hydrochloride
Acetaminophen/Cod
eine Phosphate
Hydrocodone
Bitartrate/Ibuprofen

00093002401

16

MG

0.15

68115035260

Tablet

7.5

MG

1

00054454725
00034051310

The conversion factors for standardizing benzodiazepines are not as
universally agreed upon. For this analysis, the peer-reviewed conversion factors
reported by Shader et al. (1994) that converts all benzodiazepines into a
standardized diazepam milligram equivalent (DME) were selected, but there are
some disagreements in the literature about the appropriate scale of conversion
factors for some benzodiazepine drugs and the difference in conversion
magnitude for parenteral versus oral dosage forms.87,88 Table 3.2 contains a
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sample of these diazepam-equivalent conversions for selected prescription
benzodiazepines.
Table 3.2 Conversion Factors for Selected Benzodiazepines to Standardized
Diazepam Milligram Equivalents
Generic
Medication Name

National Drug
Code (NDC)

Dosage Form

Strength

Unit of
Dosage
Measurement

Diazepam
Conversion
Factor

Clorazepate
Dipotassium

00003086250

Capsule

3.75

MG

15

Chlordiazepoxide
Hydrochloride

00074264853

Capsule

5

MG

50

Temazepam

00078009913

Capsule

30

MG

30

Estazolam

00093013001

Tablet

2

MG

2

Clonazepam

00185006310

Tablet

0.5

MG

0.5

Triazolam

00364259833

Tablet

0.125

MG

0.25

The unit of analysis for this retrospective study was NDC-State-Year level
observations.

The

standardized

quantities

of

dispensed

opioid

and

benzodiazepines were set as the dependent variables (four specifications:
Schedule II opioids, Schedule III opioids, Schedule IV benzodiazepines, and
Unscheduled opioids) and data on the characteristics of state PDMPs, defined
and operationalized in Chapter 2, were the explanatory variables of interest.
State PDMP characteristics of interest were coded as dummy variables where “1”
represented the presence of the PDMP characteristic within the state during the
time period of the observation and “0” represented the absence of the PDMP
characteristic within the state during the time period of the observation. Summary
frequencies of each PDMP characteristic of interest as well as frequency of NDC
observations per state-year within the dataset can be found in Table 3.3.
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All statistical analysis was performed in Stata v13. A correlation matrix that
tested the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent
variables was constructed before regression analysis to test for unexpected
relationships between the explanatory variables. There were several strong
correlations between certain PDMP characteristics as expected; for instance, all
states with operational PDMPs monitor Schedule II controlled substances so this
variable is not included in the analysis.
The longitudinal nature of the observations called for setting up the
analysis as panel data. Fixed and random effects models were run and a
Hausman test was performed to compare within and between estimators. The
Hausman test indicated that the random effects model was a more appropriate
fit, but it should be noted that the “within” effects estimators were small (within
estimators <0.001 in all specifications) due to the limited variation in PDMP
characteristics over time. Coefficients were estimated via Greater Least Squares
(GLS) regression and Stata’s “robust” option was utilized to correct for
heteroscedasticity. The summary of the regression results can be seen in Table
3.5.
There was significant variation in the number of controlled substance
Schedules monitored by state PDMPs. Controls for Schedule monitoring were
used but there were too few observations to conduct the Schedule V opioid
specification, due to the rarity of Schedule V opioids.
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Results
Table 3.3 below provides a summary of the PDMP characteristic
frequencies observed in the data. All states with a PDMP monitor Schedule II
controlled substances and most monitored Schedules III and IV controlled
substances by 2011, the end of the study period. Few states require registration
and compulsory prescriber use was relatively rare during the study period.
Table 3.3 State PDMP Characteristics (Total NDC-State-Years=180,578)
PDMP Variable
Operational PDMP
Proactive PDMP: Prescribers
Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Data Transmission <1 Week
Schedule III Monitored
Schedule IV Monitored
Schedule V Monitored
Unscheduled Substances Monitored

States with
Characteristic
(in 2011)

Total NDC-State-Year
Observations

43
38
25
13
14
5
22
7
37
36
22
37

45,891
35,065
50,429
25,978
12,892
1,532
12,097
2,314
42,042
41,870
30,505
13,780

Table 3.4 illustrates the Schedule classification of the prescription opioids
and benzodiazepines in the data and how they are distributed. There were very
few observations of Schedule V drugs and Unscheduled substances.
Table 3.4 NDC-State-Year Observations of Opioids and Benzodiazepines, by
Schedule
Schedule
Schedule II
Schedule III
Schedule IV
Schedule V
Unscheduled Substances

Frequency (% of Total)
266,411 (23.91%)
226,481 (20.33%)
596,274 (53.52%)
18 (<0.01%)
24,904 (2.24%)

Figure 3.1 shows the log of opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions
dispensed over time by Schedule, as measured in standardized units of MMEs
(opioids)

and

DMEs

(benzodiazepines).
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Only

Unscheduled

prescription

medications experienced a downward trend in dispensing over time. Schedule V
was excluded due to there being too few Schedule V opioids.
Figure 3.1 Opioid (Schedule II, II, Unscheduled) and Benzodiazepine (Schedule
4) Controlled Substance Dispensing, 1999-2011

Figure

3.2

below

shows

the

(log)

dollar

amount

of

Medicaid

reimbursement for all opioids and benzodiazepine prescription medications over
time for each Schedule of controlled substances. Total Medicaid reimbursement
increased for each Schedule, but at a lower rate for Schedule IV substances.
Schedule V substances were excluded due to a lack of observations.
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Figure 3.2 Medicaid Reimbursement for Opioids and Benzodiazepines, by
Schedule for 1999-2011

Table 3.5 includes the results of the regression analysis for Schedule II
and Schedule III opioid MMEs, and Table 3.6 includes regression results for
Unscheduled opioid MMEs and Schedule IV benzodiazepine DMEs. The
presence of an operational PDMP was associated with 26 percent decrease in
Schedule II opioid MMEs dispensed (p<0.05) and a 24 percent increase in
Schedule

IV

benzodiazepine

DMEs

(p<0.05)

dispensed

to

Medicaid

beneficiaries, but had no significant impact in dispensed opioid MMEs from lower
Schedules.
Schedule III opioid MME dispensing increased in states that had
compulsory registration and prescriber use of the PDMP by 28 percent and 27
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percent, respectively (p<0.05). While interstate data sharing was associated with
an 18 percent decrease in Schedule II opioid MME dispensing, there was no
statistically significant impact on Schedule III opioid MME dispensing.
Conversely, frequent pharmacy data transmission was associated with
decreased Schedule III opioid MME dispensing (29 percent, p<0.05), but not with
Schedule II opioid MME dispensing.
Proactive reports to prescribers were associated with increases in MMEs
and DMEs dispensed in every Schedule, with the exception of Schedule III. Open
law enforcement access to PDMP data was associated with decreases in
Unscheduled MME and Schedule IV DME dispensing, but had no significant
relationship with MME dispensing of higher Scheduled opioids. Frequent data
transmission was associated with a 36 percent decrease in Unscheduled opioid
MME dispensing and a 34 percent decrease in benzodiazepine DME dispensing
(p<0.05)

as
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well.

Table 3.5 The Impact of PDMP State Characteristics on (logged) Total Units of
Schedule II and Schedule III Opioid MMEs Dispensed
Schedule II Opioid
MMEs
Independent Variables
PDMP Variables
Operational PDMP
Proactive PDMP: Prescribers
Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Data Transmission <1 Week
Monitors Schedule III
Monitors Schedule IV
Monitors Schedule V
Monitors Unscheduled Substances
Year Covariates (1991 is reference)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Schedule III Opioid
MMEs
†

Coefficient

Robust SE

Coefficient

Robust SE

-0.26*
0.12*
0.08*
-0.03
0.08
-0.08
-0.18*
-0.08
-0.57*
0.85*
-0.04
-0.18*

0.09
0.05
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.10
0.04
0.07
0.24
0.23
0.05
0.05

-0.06
0.12
-0.03
0.04
0.28*
0.27*
-0.01
-0.29*
-1.06*
1.12*
-0.13*
0.11

0.08
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.06
0.10
0.31
0.31
0.06
0.06

0.04
0.06
0.12*
0.07
0.02
0.11
-0.03
0.12*
-0.06
-0.01
-0.13*
0.02
0.03
0.11
0.01
-0.01
0.06
0.15*
0.09
0.03

0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06

0.55*
0.31*
0.52*
0.81*
0.88*
0.83*
0.91*
0.95*
0.77*
0.90*
0.66*
0.63*
0.69*
0.51*
0.43*
0.52*
0.68*
0.79*
0.99*
1.13*

0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.08

†

Abbreviation for Standard Error
*Indicates statistical significance: p<0.05
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Table 3.6 The Impact of PDMP State Characteristics on (logged) Total Units of
Unscheduled Opioid MMEs and Schedule IV Benzodiazepine DMEs Dispensed
Independent Variables
PDMP Variables
Operational PDMP
Proactive PDMP: Prescribers
Proactive PDMP: Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Data Transmission <1 Week
Monitors Schedule III
Monitors Schedule IV
Monitors Schedule V
Monitors Unscheduled Substances
Year Covariates (1991 is reference)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Unscheduled Opioid
MMEs
Coefficient Robust SE

Schedule IV Benzodiazepine
DMEs
Coefficient
Robust SE

-0.12
0.47*
-0.10
-0.21*
-0.00
0.05
-0.01
-0.36*
-0.74
0.83
0.15
0.04

0.25
0.13
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.24
0.10
0.16
0.58
0.54
0.11
0.12

0.24*
0.40*
-0.05
-0.06*
0.11*
-0.24*
-0.03
-0.34*
-1.21*
0.99*
-0.17*
0.22*

0.07
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.13
0.05
0.09
0.39
0.39
0.05
0.05

0.10
-0.54
-0.30
0.21
0.24
0.65*
0.45
0.44
-0.29
1.54*
0.60*
-0.43
-0.60*
-0.82*
-0.98*
-0.85*
-1.19*
-1.60*
-1.53*
-1.37*
*Indicates statistical significance: p<0.05

0.29
0.35
0.34
0.35
0.29
0.32
0.31
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.27
0.28
0.28
0.27
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.26
0.26
0.27

0.01
0.05
-0.17*
-0.33*
-0.28*
-0.37*
-0.36*
-0.29*
-0.71*
-0.79*
-0.93*
-0.91*
-0.85*
-1.16*
-1.27*
-1.52*
-1.38*
-1.59*
-1.28*
-1.29*

0.03
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.06

Discussion
States dispense an increasing number of opioids and benzodiazepines
each year to Medicaid beneficiaries, but states with operational PDMPs tend to
dispense

fewer

total

units of

Schedule

II

opioids and

Schedule

IV

benzodiazepines to Medicaid beneficiaries when compared to states without
operational PDMPs. This suggests a possible substitution effect or shift from
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Schedule II opioids to alternative pain-relief treatments; though, an increase in
Schedule III opioids was not observed in states with operational PDMPs. PDMP
features also appear to have differential impacts on the Schedule of controlled
substance being examined; for example, states that share PDMP data with other
states had lower Schedule II opioid dispensations, but not lower Schedule III
opioid dispensations.
Interestingly, states with compulsory PDMP registration appear to
dispense more units of Scheduled II opioids and Schedule IV benzodiazepines
than states without compulsory PDMP registration. This seems to contradict the
notion that PDMPs decrease controlled substance prescribing/dispensing;
however, it is possible that prescribers who are required to use the PDMP are
more confident in their prescribing decisions when compared to prescribers that
only use the PDMP in circumstances where they already suspect a patient’s
problematic controlled substance history. Compulsory use of the PDMP suggests
that the prescriber must incorporate PDMP data into the assessment and
treatment of the patient’s conditions; whereas, the availability of PDMP data in a
state where the prescriber may use the PDMP only at their discretion suggests
that the PDMP serves as one of many tools by which assessment and treatment
decisions are justified.
The Schedules monitored by state PDMPs also have an influence on the
amount of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed within states. Most notably,
there was reduced dispensing of both Schedule II and Schedule III opioids in
states that enacted Schedule III opioid monitoring by the PDMP; however, the
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magnitude of the reduction in Schedule III opioids was much larger. What
remains unclear, however, is if decreases in the amount of opioids and
benzodiazepines dispensed is the “desirable” outcome of PDMPs.41
This research design has several limitations. First, the analysis was limited
to two classes of prescription medications, though opioids and benzodiazepines
do make up a significant portion of controlled substance dispensing in the United
States. Further study with this data should include an expanded selection of
drugs, both Scheduled and Unscheduled. A second limitation of this design is the
possibility that PDMPs cause a shift in dispensing of Scheduled substances that
is unobserved due to the use of conversion factors. For example, lower
Scheduled substances tend to be converted to smaller unit sizes than higher
Scheduled substances. This could lead to an underrepresentation of lower
Scheduled substances, or overrepresentation of higher Scheduled substances, in
the standardized count of units dispensed. Repeating the analysis without the
use of conversions to standardized units and comparing the results to the current
analysis could test this possibility.
Finally, total quantities of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed to
Medicaid beneficiaries may not be representative of trends of opioid and
benzodiazepine dispensing to the population as a whole. There is some evidence
to suggest that Medicaid patients tend to use more opioid controlled substances
and for longer periods of time than patients with private pay or commercial
insurance and this increased usage has been documented for non-cancer pain
conditions89 as well as all pain conditions.90
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Several characteristics of state PDMPs are associated with changes in the
total amount of opioids and benzodiazepines dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries
in a state, but it is unclear whether changes in the dispensing of these
substances has a clinical impact on treatment accessibility for legitimate medical
need or an impact on the reduction of abuse and diversion. The evidence
presented above supports hypothesis 1 (states with PDMPs have decreased
dispensing of opioids and benzodiazepines) and partially supports hypothesis 2
(some PDMP characteristics are associated with decreased dispensing of
opioids and benzodiazepines).
The evidence does not definitely support the hypothesis that a
“substitution effect” between higher Scheduled substances and lower Scheduled
substances is occurring between opioids, and the possibility of unobserved
factors not accounted for in this analysis should encourage caution with the
conclusions that have been drawn. Future versions of this study should attempt
to include measurements of prescriber, pharmacist, and law enforcement
participation in the PDMP rather than the indicator variables for compulsory
registration and compulsory prescriber use of the PDMP. Information about the
frequency of use and the change in prescriber or dispenser behavior resulting
from PDMP use would provide a more complete measurement tool of PDMP
impact on dispensing.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Trends in Opioid Prescribing Associated with Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs:
Claims from a Commercially Insured Population
Chapter Summary: A retrospective analysis of commercial insurance prescription claims data is
undertaken to examine the impact of PDMPs on the healthcare system by analyzing patterns in
opioid prescription claims. Utilization estimates of selected opioids dispensed over time are
calculated to characterize prescribing trends, then the relationship between opioid prescribing
and the PDMP features and regulations operationalized in Chapter 2 is quantified. The 20072009 time period for this analysis allows for a “natural” policy experiment, due to the heavy
uptake in state PDMP implementation within this time frame.

This empirical chapter continues with the exploration of state prescription
drug monitoring program (PDMPs) effects on the marketplace for prescription
drugs and touches upon effects on the healthcare system resulting from PDMPs
by analyzing patterns in opioid prescription claims from a commercially insured
United States patient population. At this time, commercial insurance prescription
claims have rarely been used as a data source in published evaluations of
PDMPs or in conceptualizing opioid consumption with regards to PDMP
implementation. A pharmacy benefit manager database for commercial claims
was used to calculate state-level opioid prescription prevalence estimates for the
year 2000, and this estimate did include an analysis of the relationship between
PDMP presence and opioid prescription rate (finding decreased opioid utilization
in states that monitored Schedule II controlled substances), but did not control for
other PDMP characteristics or pharmaceutical opioid control policies.41
In contrast with Medicaid populations, commercially insured populations
tend to be older, wealthier, and report different frequencies of diseases and
injuries associated with chronic pain.91 This suggests that PDMPs may have a
differential

impact

on

commercially

60

insured

patient

prescription

opioid

consumption as compared to the trends observed from Medicaid in the previous
chapter. The purpose of this study is to quantify overall opioid consumption and
consumption by opioid type in this population, then explore a possible
relationship between PDMP presence and features of the quantity and type of
opioids prescribed and consumed.
Methods
The research design for this chapter is a retrospective analysis of
commercial insurance claims data, with calculated utilization estimates of
selected opioids (hydrocodone, oxycodone, buprenorphine, methadone, and
hydromorphone) dispensed over time to examine prescribing trends as
correlated with the PDMP features and regulations operationalized in the prior
two chapters. The highlighted opioids (hydrocodone, oxycodone, buprenorphine,
methadone, hydromorphone) are isolated as dependent variables to determine if
there are differential impacts of PDMPs on the dispensation of these substances
to commercial insurance beneficiaries. These opioids were chosen based on the
review of the literature, where evidence suggests that these opioids are the most
susceptible to abuse and diversion.92-94
The 2007-2009 time period for this analysis allows for a “natural” policy
experiment, due to the heavy uptake in state PDMP implementation within this
time frame (i.e., 23 states had established PDMPs for the whole research period,
17 states and the District of Columbia had no PDMP during the research period,
and 10 states implemented their PDMP at some point during this period).
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The patient population is defined as those who were continuously enrolled
in the commercial insurer’s health plans from January 1, 2007 through December
31, 2009. The commercial insurance claims database, the i3 InVision Data Mart,
contains de-identified medical and prescription claims records from a
representative sample of every state totaling 22 million covered lives. This
database does contain a small number of records for Medicaid Managed Care
patients but these patients were excluded from analysis. Figure 4.1 outlines
exclusion and inclusion procedure. Patients were included if they were over 18
years of age and under 64 years of age to avoid un-captured prescriptions due to
potential overlapping coverage from the Children’s Health Insurance Program if
under 18 or Medicare if older than 64. Patients were required to have at least one
prescription opioid for inclusion in the study population.
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Figure 4.1 Patient Population Inclusion and Exclusion Procedure
Total Commercial
Insurance Patients
(n=21,891,711)

Medicaid Managed
Care Excluded
(n=1,157,898)

Continuously
Enrolled

Aged 18 to 64

Had at Least One
Opioid Prescription

Final Patient
Population
(n=1,296,614)

Opioid prescriptions were identified in claims using national drug code
identification numbers as outlined in the previous chapter. For clarity, opioid
prescriptions were summed as whole prescriptions per patient rather than
quantity of dosages to patient per prescription. The database contained precoded flags for opioid prescriptions, and individual opioid prescription types (e.g.,
products containing hydrocodone, products containing oxycodone, products
containing hydromorphone) were flagged using regular expressions of partial or
full text matches within the field for active ingredient drug name. Descriptive
statistics were calculated for prescription frequencies as well as patient and
patient state of residence characteristics. Next, a count regression model was
employed to examine predictors of the count of opioid prescriptions per patient,
the dependent variable, on patient-level and state-level independent variables.
Patient-level predictors and covariates include age, gender, and race, and state63

level predictors include PDMP presence in the state of patient residence and
PDMP program features.
Clustering was conducted by state and estimated coefficients were
converted to incidence rate ratios. The first specification included all opioid
prescriptions, while additional specifications were isolated to selected opioid
types. Negative binomial distributions were fitted to each specification of the
dependent variable, which was appropriate due to over-dispersed counts of
opioid prescriptions per patient. All analysis was conducted in Stata v13. 95

Results
Total opioid prescriptions increased during the study period, with
oxycodone and hydrocodone products representing the most substantial
increases in opioid prescriptions from 2007 to 2009 (Table 4.1). Prescriptions for
“other” opioids decreased during the study period. Overall, 6,310,730 opioid
prescriptions were dispensed to the commercially insured patients in this
population during the study period.
Table 4.1 Commercial Insurance Patient Utilization of Opioid Prescriptions by
Year and Type, All States and District of Columbia
Opioid Type
Hydrocodone
Oxycodone
Buprenorphine
Methadone
Hydromorphone
Other Opioids
*
Total Opioid Prescriptions

Year 2007
n (%)

Year 2008
n (%)

Year 2009
n (%)

942,639 (49.85%)
354,747 (18.76%)
11,535 (0.61%)
19,250 (1.02%)
13,168 (0.70%)
549,668 (29.07%)
1,891,007

1,066,857 (49.54%)
415,018 (19.27%)
16,905 (0.79%)
21,729 (1.01%)
16,918 (0.80%)
515,871 (23.96%)
2,153,298

1,118,978 (49.37%)
463,809 (20.46%)
23,022 (1.02%)
23,167 (1.02%)
21,161 (0.93%)
516,288 (22.78%)
2,266,425

*

An individual patient may have multiple prescriptions in the dataset.

There were 1,296,614 unique patients represented in the data and a
patient could potentially have multiple opioid prescriptions. More females (56.53
percent) than males (43.47 percent) received an opioid prescription at least once
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during the study period (Table 4.2). The majority of patients who received at least
one opioid prescription identified as white race (75.84 percent) and 8.01 percent
identified as Hispanic. More than half of patients had either some college
education or a college degree and mean age was 44 years. Hydrocodone
prescriptions (mean 12.34 prescriptions) were the most common type of opioid
prescriptions in the patient population, but it should be noted that the distribution
of opioid prescriptions in each opioid type was skewed such that mean was
greater than the median.
Patients resided in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. In 2007,
40.33 percent of patients were residing in states that had an operational PDMP
and by 2009 that proportion increased to 55.47 percent due to the uptake in state
PDMP implementation. Proactive prescriber reporting by state PDMPs also
experienced a substantial increase in implementation, with 28.66 percent of
patients residing in proactive states in 2007 and 41.49 percent by 2009. Few
states engaged in compulsory prescriber PDMP use or pharmacy prescription
record data transmissions of less than one week during the study period. There
was no variation in state PDMP monitoring of Schedule III and Schedule IV
substances during this period.
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Table 4.2 Commercial Insurance Patient Population and State of Residence
Characteristics by Year, All States and District of Columbia
Characteristics
Patient
Gender
Female
Male
Race
White
Black
Other and Multiple Races
Missing Race Data
Hispanic Ethnicity
Education Level
Less than High School
High School
Some College
College and Beyond
Missing Education Data
Age in Years
Hydrocodone Prescriptions
Oxycodone Prescriptions
Buprenorphine Prescriptions
Methadone Prescriptions
Hydromorphone Prescriptions
Other Opioid Prescriptions
All Opioid Prescriptions
*
Patient State of Residence
PDMP Operational
Proactive Prescribers
Proactive Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Data Transmission <1 Week
Schedule III Monitored
†
Schedule IV Monitored
Schedule V Monitored
Unscheduled Substances
Monitored
‡
Total Unique Patients

Year 2007
n (%)

Year 2008
n (%)

Year 2009
n (%)

All Years
n (%)

359,965 (58.03%)
260,320 (41.97%)

221,907 (55.95%)
174,698 (44.05%)

151,168 (54.04%)
128,556 (45.96%)

733,040 (56.53%)
563,574 (43.47%)

475,795 (76.71%)
31,579 (5.09%)
60,744 (9.79%)
52,167 (8.41%)
48,505 (7.82%)

298,645 (75.30%)
23,844 (6.01%)
39,868 (10.05%)
34,248 (8.64%)
31,836 (8.03%)

208,856 (74.67%)
16,011 (5.72%)
29,701 (10.62%)
25,156 (8.99%)
23,501 (8.40%)

983,296 (75.84%)
71,434 (5.51%)
130,313 (10.05%)
111,571 (8.6%)
103,842 (8.01%)

9,857 (1.59%)
213,206 (34.37%)
284,750 (45.91%)
95,108 (15.33%)
17,364 (2.8%)
Mean (SD)
43.77 (11.18)
12.23 (19.27)
7.40 (18.38)
0.40 (3.65)
0.66 (4.49)
0.41 (3.22)
9.50 (19.56)
30.60 (36.05)
n (%)
268,761 (43.33%)
177,778 (28.66%)
254,319 (41.00%)
152,762 (24.63%)
83,820 (13.51%)
23,477 (3.78%)
111,994 (18.06%)
0 (0.00%)
262,998 (42.40%)
262,998 (42.40%)
241,446 (38.93%)
71,329 (11.50%)

6,633 (1.67%)
137,902 (34.77%)
177,282 (44.70%)
63,481 (16.01%)
11,307 (2.85%)
Mean (SD)
44.48 (11.37)
12.57 (19.22)
7.34 (17.99)
0.37 (3.52)
0.62 (4.38)
0.40 (3.16)
9.42 (18.98)
30.73 (35.14)
n (%)
188,817 (47.61%)
136,584 (34.44%)
175,055 (44.14%)
98,837 (24.92%)
75,045 (18.92%)
13,601 (3.43%)
82,378 (20.77%)
12,419 (3.13%)
185,097 (46.67%)
185,097 (46.67%)
157,475 (39.71%)
45,344 (11.43%)

4,722 (1.69%)
93,438 (33.40%)
126,691 (45.29%)
47,086 (16.83%)
7,787 (2.79%)
Mean (SD)
45.34 (11.36)
12.21 (18.53)
7.08 (17.42)
0.34 (3.37)
0.58 (4.23)
0.38 (2.96)
8.82 (18.05)
29.41 (33.82)
n (%)
155,165 (55.47%)
116,057 (41.49%)
126,095 (45.08%)
71,486 (25.56%)
65,834 (23.54%)
9,438 (3.37%)
72,114 (25.78%)
10,503 (3.75%)
152,311 (54.45%)
152,311 (54.45%)
118,174 (67.27%)
38,422 (13.74%)

21,212 (1.64%)
444,546 (34.29%)
588,723 (45.40%)
205,675 (15.86%)
36,458 (2.81%)
Mean (SD)
44.32 (11.29)
12.34 (18.99)
7.27 (17.91)
0.37 (3.51)
0.62 (4.36)
0.39 (3.11)
9.23 (18.83)
30.22 (34.96)
n (%)
612,743 (47.26%)
430,419 (33.20%)
555,469 (42.84%)
323,085 (24.92%)
224,699 (17.33%)
46,516 (3.59%)
266,486 (20.55%)
22,922 (1.77%)
600,406 (46.31%)
600,406 (46.31%)
517,095 (39.88%)
155,095 (11.96%)

620,285

396,605

279,724

1,296,614

*

Indicates the number of unique patients residing in states with the highlighted program
characteristics.
†
Omitted in multivariate modeling due to lack of state-level variation between Schedule III and
Schedule IV monitoring during the study period.
‡
Unique patients represent the number of unduplicated individual patients identified in the dataset
(i.e., an individual may appear in the dataset multiple times if they have more than one
prescription, but here they are only counted on their first appearance).

Table 4.3 contains regression results for each model specification.
Females were less likely than males to receive prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR:
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0.87; 95% CI: 0.80-0.95), methadone (IRR: 0.82; 95% CI: 0.71-0.95), and
buprenorphine (IRR: 0.50; 95% CI: 0.41-0.61); however, females were more
likely than males to receive hydrocodone (IRR: 1.09; 95% CI: 1.04-1.14), and
prescriptions for all other types of opioids (IRR: 1.41; 95% CI: 1.33-1.49).
Patients who identified as black race were less likely to receive prescriptions for
any type of opioid when compared to their white race counterparts and patients
who are Hispanic were less likely to receive prescriptions for any type of opioid
when compared to patients who are not Hispanic.
Lower educational attainment (high school degree or some college) was
associated with a greater number of hydrocodone prescriptions when compared
to patients with a college degree. Interestingly, lower educational attainment was
associated with significantly fewer buprenorphine prescriptions when compared
to patients with a college degree. Older age was associated with a greater
number of opioid prescriptions for every type of opioid with the exception of
buprenorphine, where younger age was associated with a higher number of
buprenorphine prescriptions.
The presence of an operational PDMP was associated with fewer
prescriptions for hydrocodone (IRR: 0.73; 95% CI: 0.62-0.86) and methadone
(IRR: 0.65; 95% CI: 0.53-0.80), but greater prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR:
1.58; 95% CI: 1.20-2.09). Proactive reporting of patient prescription records to
prescribers was associated with greater prescriptions for buprenorphine (IRR:
1.61; 95% CI: 1.16-2.25) and hydromorphone (IRR: 1.85; 95% CI: 1.34-2.55).
Proactive reporting of prescription records to law enforcement officials was also
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associated with greater buprenorphine prescriptions (IRR: 1.39; 95% CI: 1.141.69).
States that permitted law enforcement access to PDMP records without
requiring a warrant, court order, or subpoena had an interesting relationship with
opioid prescribing; hydrocodone prescriptions, which were Scheduled III during
the study period, were higher in these states (IRR: 1.27; 95% CI: 1.06-1.52) while
prescriptions for the Schedule II oxycodone products were lower in these states
(IRR: 0.62; 95% CI: 0.46-0.85).
Compulsory prescriber registration was associated with a greater number
of prescriptions for oxycodone (IRR: 1.83; 95% CI: 1.20-2.78), methadone (IRR:
1.34; 95% CI: 1.09-1.64), and hydromorphone (IRR: 1.58; 95% CI: 1.04-2.38), as
was compulsory prescriber use of the PDMP; oxycodone (IRR: 2.08 (1.17-3.70),
methadone (IRR: 1.82; 95% CI: 1.21-2.73), and hydromorphone (IRR: 2.16; 95%
CI: 1.42-3.27). Participation in interstate data sharing between state PMDPs was
also associated with greater oxycodone prescriptions (IRR: 1.22; 95% CI: 1.031.46), but was not significantly associated with other types of opioid
prescriptions.
Frequent (<1 week) pharmacy data transmission to the PDMP was
associated with fewer opioid prescriptions overall (IRR: 0.85; 95% CI: 0.75-0.95),
and specifically with oxycodone (IRR: 0.63; 95% CI: 0.45-0.89), methadone (IRR:
0.73; 95% CI: 0.58-0.93), and hydromorphone (IRR: 0.54; 95% CI: 0.32-0.89).
All prescription opioids were classified as Schedule II, III, or V during the
study period. The monitoring of lower (III and V) Scheduled substances had
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varying relationships with the number of opioid prescriptions in the population,
while the monitoring of non-controlled substances, also known as un-Scheduled
substances, were not associated with changes in the number of opioid
prescriptions

in

this

commercially
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insured

population.

Table 4.3 Negative Binomial Regression Results (n=6,310,730 prescriptions)
All Opioid
Prescriptions
IRR† (95% CI‡)
1.09 (1.04-1.13)*

Hydrocodone
Prescriptions
IRR (95% CI)
1.09 (1.04-1.14)*

Oxycodone
Prescriptions
IRR (95% CI)
0.87 (0.80-0.95)*

Female
Race (Reference White)
Black
0.73 (0.69-0.78)*
0.76 (0.70-0.81)*
0.73 (0.62-0.86)*
Other and Multiple Races
0.90 (0.85-0.94)*
0.88 (0.82-0.95)*
0.87 (0.81-0.94)*
Hispanic Ethnicity
0.71 (0.65-0.77)*
0.68 (0.61-0.75)*
0.75 (0.59-0.96)*
Education Level
Less than High School
0.96 (0.87-1.05)
1.12 (0.98-1.28)
0.88 (0.71-1.08)
High School
1.15 (1.10-1.20)*
1.25 (1.18-1.32)*
1.11 (0.99-1.24)
Some College
1.14 (1.11-1.18)*
1.15 (1.10-1.21)*
1.17 (1.07-1.26)*
College and Beyond
Ref.
Ref.
Ref.
Age
1.01 (1.01-1.01)*
1.01 (1.00-1.01)*
1.01 (1.00-1.01)*
Year (Reference 2007)
2008
0.99 (0.95-1.02)
1.01 (0.98-1.04)
0.97 (0.90-1.04)
2009
0.93 (0.90-0.97)*
0.98 (0.95-1.00)
0.91 (0.83-1.00)
State of Residence
Characteristics
PDMP Operational
1.03 (0.95-1.12)
0.73 (0.62-0.86)*
1.58 (1.20-2.09)*
Proactive Prescribers
1.14 (1.04-1.26)*
1.10 (0.94-1.29)
1.25 (0.80-1.97)
Proactive Law
0.99 (0.94-1.06)
1.09 (0.95-1.24)
0.90 (0.71-1.14)
Enforcement
Law Enforcement Access
1.01 (0.92-1.11)
1.27 (1.06-1.52)*
0.62 (0.46-0.85)*
Compulsory Registration
1.16 (1.06-1.27)*
1.06 (0.90-1.24)
1.83 (1.20-2.78)*
Compulsory Prescriber
1.15 (1.01-1.31)*
0.92 (0.72-1.17)
2.08 (1.17-3.70)*
Use
Interstate Data Sharing
1.08 (0.99-1.17)
1.01 (0.90-1.12)
1.22 (1.03-1.46)*
Data Transmission <1
0.85 (0.75-0.95)*
0.89 (0.79-1.01)
0.63 (0.45-0.89)*
Week
Schedule III Monitored
0.87 (0.74-1.01)
1.27 (0.95-1.69)
0.57 (0.29-1.12)
Schedule V Monitored
0.95 (0.86-1.05)
1.06 (0.93-1.21)
0.57 (0.38-0.86)*
Unscheduled Substances
0.98 (0.91-1.06)
0.96 (0.84-1.10)
0.99 (0.73-1.34)
Monitored
†IRR refers to Incidence Rate Ratio, abbreviated throughout the remaining chapters.
‡CI refers to Confidence Interval, abbreviated throughout the remaining chapters.
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05.
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Buprenorphine
Prescriptions
IRR (95% CI)
0.50 (0.41-0.61)*

Methadone
Prescriptions
IRR (95% CI)
0.82 (0.71-0.95)*

Hydromorphone
Prescriptions
IRR (95% CI)
1.04 (0.91-1.19)

0.71 (0.53-0.96)*
1.22 (0.93-1.60)
0.76 (0.50-1.15)

0.62 (0.48-0.82)*
0.85 (0.71-1.01)
0.53 (0.44-0.65)*

0.68 (0.50-0.93)*
0.90 (0.69-1.17)
0.74 (0.55-1.00)*

0.28 (0.12-0.63)*
0.68 (0.48-0.95)*
0.72 (0.57-0.92)*
Ref.
0.94 (0.93-0.95)*

0.44 (0.29-0.66)*
1.16 (0.99-1.35)
1.18 (1.05-1.33)*
Ref.
1.01 (1.00-1.02)*

0.58 (0.35-0.95)*
0.67 (0.53-0.85)*
1.01 (0.83-1.23)
Ref.
1.00 (1.00-1.01)

0.92 (0.83-1.01)
0.88 (0.78-1.00)*

0.93 (0.87-0.98)*
0.86 (0.80-0.92)*

0.98 (0.88-1.10)
0.93 (0.81-1.06)

1.14 (0.85-1.53)
1.61 (1.16-2.25)*
1.39 (1.14-1.69)*

0.65 (0.53-0.80)*
1.29 (0.88-1.90)
1.07 (0.88-1.31)

1.29 (0.91-1.83)
1.85 (1.34-2.55)*
0.88 (0.69-1.14)

0.98 (0.66-1.45)
1.40 (0.83-2.36)
1.47 (0.86-2.53)

0.89 (0.74-1.07)
1.34 (1.09-1.64)*
1.82 (1.21-2.73)*

1.02 (0.71-1.46)
1.58 (1.04-2.38)*
2.16 (1.42-3.27)*

0.79 (0.60-1.04)
0.62 (0.34-1.13)

1.06 (0.92-1.22)
0.73 (0.58-0.93)*

1.32 (0.87-2.00)
0.54 (0.32-0.89)*

0.76 (0.26-2.14)
0.72 (0.35-1.49)
0.86 (0.62-1.18)

0.97 (0.60-1.58)
1.00 (0.83-1.21)
1.03 (0.76-1.40)

0.33 (0.19-0.56)*
0.93 (0.61-1.40)
1.30 (0.98-1.72)

Discussion
Commercially insured patients are likely impacted by PDMP regulations
differentially than those insured by Medicaid. In fact, several results in this
analysis suggest that access to certain opioids increased to this population after
PDMP regulations were strengthened or implemented as compared to the overall
decrease in Schedule II opioid utilization by Medicaid patients found in the
previous chapter.
This increase in access to certain opioids suggests that compulsory
prescriber PDMP use may have increased prescriber confidence in treatment
decisions when prescribing certain opioids and opioids in general to their patients
for pain, but just having an operational PDMP (and not necessarily a PDMP with
compulsory use) would seem to decrease access to opioids such as
hydrocodone and methadone while increasing access to oxycodone in this
population.
There are several limitations associated with this analysis. First, the
exogenous impacts of changes in other policies, regulations, and clinical
recommendations related to opioid prescribing are not controlled for in this
analysis. Second, the definition of this population was limited to individuals who
were continuously enrolled in the same, albeit large, insurer for the duration of
the study period. This means that the prescription records of patients lost to plan
switches or changes in eligibility status were not captured in this analysis, nor
were patients under age 18 or over age 65, both of which age groups are
included in the aggregate Medicaid data analysis in the previous chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Heroin Abuse Treatment Discharges and Opioid Prescriptions Dispensed in
Kentucky
Chapter Summary: This chapter delves into one of the more controversial relationships between
state policy interventions for opioid abuse and the resulting possible unintended consequences
by focusing on data collected from Kentucky. House Bill 1, a statute enacted by Kentucky
legislature in 2012, called for tightening PDMP regulations to combat prescription opioid abuse. A
potential relationship between the presumed restriction in prescription opioid supply and heroin
abuse, by proxy of heroin abuse treatment discharge records, is explored using linked data
between Kentucky’s PDMP records and substance abuse treatment facility discharges for fiscal
years 2009-2013. Prescriptions for opioids for patients with and without heroin abuse treatment
discharges are compared before and after the implementation of the policy.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky enacted House Bill 1 in 2012,96 which
required prescribers of controlled substances to register with and utilize
Kentucky’s prescription drug monitoring program, known as the Kentucky AllSchedule Prescription Electronic Reporting program (KASPER). House Bill 1 was
intended to quell prescription opioid abuse; however, surveillance indicators
suggest heroin abuse is on the rise while prescription opioid abuse has
decreased in Kentucky.7,51
Prescription opioid abuse deterrents have included changes to KASPER
such as those mentioned above, reformulation of certain prescription opioids,
tightening of pain clinic regulations, and changes in treatment guidelines for both
pain management and opioid dependence. Heroin, an illicit opioid, may serve as
a substitute for licit pharmaceutical opioids when persons with prescription opioid
substance use disorders have difficulty obtaining their substance of preference.
Research has established the co-occurrence of prescription opioid and heroin
use for individuals receiving substance abuse treatment. 97,98 However,
prescription opioid access via licit channels has not been previously
characterized for individuals discharged from substance abuse treatment
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facilities. This missing piece represents a critical component for evaluating the
unintended consequences associated with PDMP regulation changes such as
HB1 that are primarily intended as “supply side” policies. Supply side policies are
policies that cause a shift in supply (in this case, a downward shift in
pharmaceutical opioid supply), that ultimately result in an excess of quantity of
opioids demanded. Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of this theory.
Figure 5.1 Supply Shift in the Market for Prescription Opioids

Researchers who study the marketplace for prescription and “street” drugs
have heatedly criticized supply-side policies, due to the lack of accompanying
policy to address the excess demand once supply restrictions are enacted. 99-101
The process of continuously updating supply restrictions can be likened to a
game of policy “whack-a-mole,” where new drug abuse and diversion problems
pop up because substitutes are sought when the substance of preference
becomes more difficult to obtain; a new policy is then required to control the
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supply of the new substance or distribution channel, followed by another surge in
new problematic substitutes or distribution channels, and so on, ad infinitum. The
latest move in the prescription drug policy arms race may well be the illicit
pharmaceutical opioid substitute heroin. This chapter explores the relationship
between opioid prescriptions and heroin abuse by comparing prescription
dispensation records to heroin abuse treatment facility discharges before and
after the implementation of Kentucky’s House Bill 1.
Methods
Data was acquired from two sources: the Kentucky All-Schedule
Prescription Electronic Record (KASPER) database, Kentucky’s PDMP that
contains patient-level controlled substance prescription dispensing data, and
patient-level substance abuse treatment facility discharge data from the
Treatment Episodes Data Set (TEDS). A linkage of these two datasets was
conducted on patient identifiers by a third party honest broker from the Center for
Clinical and Translational Sciences Enterprise Data Trust at the University of
Kentucky. Linked data included all controlled substance prescriptions and
substance abuse treatment facility discharges for the years 2009 through 2013.
Please note the researcher did not have access to identifying patient information
at any point in this process and worked with de-identified data transferred after
the linkage was completed. University of Kentucky and Cabinet for Health and
Family Services (CHFS) guidelines exempt this project from standalone
Institutional Review Board review because the human subjects data is deidentified,102 and use of this de-identified data for analysis was granted
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permission by CHFS on June 24, 2014 with decision document CHFS-IRBOATS-FY14-38 (documentation available upon request).
Prescriptions dispensed for pharmaceutical opioids were calculated by
select opioid type and summed to the fiscal year at the patient level for fiscal
years 2010-2013, where the pre-House Bill 1 period was defined as fiscal years
2010-2012 and the post-House Bill 1 period was defined as fiscal year 2013.
Fiscal years were selected as the unit of time for this analysis rather than
calendar years due to the July 2012 implementation date of House Bill 1.
The analysis contained several components. Patient characteristics and
prescription history for dispensed opioids for patients with treatment discharges
for heroin, opioid or other substances were compared to patients who did not
experience a treatment discharge.

Additionally, trends in treatment discharges

over time for heroin, pharmaceutical opioids and other substances were
compared.
An individual patient may have multiple treatment discharge events during
the study period and may also report poly-abuse of substances within each
episode of treatment. In the case of poly-abuse, the first three substances for
which treatment is sought are included in counts of treatment discharges but the
patient’s demographic characteristics are only counted once per treatment event.
This convention was utilized to due its presence throughout TEDS record
systems, where “primary” substance of abuse, “secondary” substance of abuse,
and “tertiary” substance of abuse are listed by ranking of the patient as well as
his/her treatment providers upon admission.
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Mean total opioid prescriptions for substance abuse treatment facility
patients discharged for heroin abuse versus treatment facility patients discharged
for the abuse of other non-opioid substances before and after House Bill 1 were
compared using two-tailed t tests. Logistic regression models estimated the
likelihood of treatment discharge for heroin relative to the discharge for other
non-opioid substances, where the predictors were number of each type of opioid
prescription with controls for age, gender, number of pharmacies dispensing to
the patient, and number of providers prescribing to the patient.
An alternative specification was constructed that included controls for
previous discharges as well as an interaction term between year of discharge
and

number

of

previous

discharges.

A

supplementary

analysis

with

pharmaceutical opioid treatment discharges rather than heroin treatment
discharges as the dependent variable was also conducted using the alternative
specification. All analysis was conducted in Stata v13.95
Results
Alcohol represents the most widely used substance for which treatment is
sought in Kentucky in every year examined, with the exception of 2011 when it
was briefly overtaken by demand for treatment of non-heroin pharmaceutical
opioid abuse. ‡ Substance abuse treatment for pharmaceutical opioids has
declined since peaking in 2011, while heroin treatment has increased in this time
(Figure 5.2). Poly-abuse of substances was most frequently reported in
combination with alcohol (e.g., treatment sought for alcohol + pharmaceutical
‡

TEDS data uses the terminology ‘other opiates’ when classifying pharmaceutical
opioids as a category of substances of abuse.
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opioids, or treatment sought for alcohol + cocaine + amphetamines). The
maximum number of treatment discharges for both heroin and pharmaceutical
opioids by an individual patient was 15 discharges in the study period. Heroin
treatment discharges represented 10.25 percent of all treatment discharges
before the implementation of House Bill 1 and 21.81 percent post-House Bill 1
(p<0.001).
Figure 5.2 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility Admissions in Kentucky, by
Substance and Year

Patients discharged from treatment facilities were a mean of 35.51 years
old as compared to a mean of 45.93 years old for Kentuckians with controlled
substance prescriptions but no treatment discharges (p<0.001). Patients with
treatment discharges were 46.90 percent female and patients with no treatment
discharges 54.84 percent were female (p<0.001). Those with discharges visited a
mean of 6.56 pharmacies (3.27 pharmacies if no treatment discharges, p<0.001),
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and had a mean of 6.96 prescribers (3.45 prescribers if no treatment discharges,
p<0.001).
In Table 5.1, opioid prescriptions dispensed to patients with treatment
discharges for heroin, pharmaceutical opioids, and other substances are
compared for the period leading up to HB1 (fiscal year 2010-2012) and following
HB1 implementation (fiscal year 2013). Pre-House Bill 1 heroin discharge
patients had greater mean opioid prescriptions compared to patients with other
substance discharges, even when including opioid discharge patients (7.38 vs.
7.29, p=NS). Heroin discharge patients, however, had fewer opioid prescriptions
post-House Bill 1 (7.32 vs. 7.38, p=NS) when opioid discharge patients were
included in the comparison group.
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Table 5.1 Characteristics and Prescriptions Dispensed to Kentucky Patients Discharged from Substance Abuse
Treatment
Pre-House Bill 1 (FY2010-2012)
Post-House Bill 1 (FY2013)

Females
Age at Discharge
Prescribers
Pharmacies
Oxycodone Scripts
Hydrocodone Scripts
Hydromorphone Scripts
Buprenorphine Scripts
All Other Opioid Scripts
TOTAL Opioid Scripts

Heroin
Treatment
Discharges
(n=5,755)
47.97%
Mean (SD)
32.25 (10.19)
6.59 (6.67)
6.30 (6.28)
1.25 (3.50)
3.46 (5.66)
0.01 (0.26)
1.50 (6.16)
0.50 (2.37)
7.38 (9.85)

Opioid
Treatment
Discharges
(n=20,090)
51.16%
Mean (SD)
33.71
(10.67)
7.42 (7.13)
7.09 (6.60)
1.26 (3.52)
3.75 (5.75)
0.01 (0.22)
2.28 (8.08)
0.46 (2.16)
8.70 (10.79)

Other Substance
Treatment
Discharges
(n=48,116)
45.89%
Mean (SD)
35.62 (11.88)

Heroin
Treatment
Discharges
(n=3,148)
46.07%
Mean (SD)
31.76 (9.68)

Opioid
Treatment
Discharges
(n=5,085)
52.79%
Mean (SD)
34.17 (10.65)

Other Substance
Treatment
Discharges
(n=11,720)
46.35%
Mean (SD)
34.46 (11.96)

6.71 (6.66)
6.30 (6.05)
0.95 (2.90)
3.64 (5.64)
0.01 (0.25)
1.12 (6.07)
0.39 (1.95)
6.93 (9.48)

6.39 (6.68)
6.10 (6.29)
1.23 (3.58)
3.63 (5.82)
0.04 (0.54)
1.43 (8.68)
0.42 (1.79)
7.32 (11.43)

7.21 (6.66)
6.89 (6.25)
1.33 (3.66)
3.95 (5.70)
0.02 (0.39)
1.93 (9.37)
0.47 (2.34)
8.53 (11.76)

6.72 (6.51)
6.32 (5.94)
0.96 (2.87)
3.77 (5.69)
0.01 (0.32)
1.17 (7.84)
0.41 (2.01)
7.08 (10.64)
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Interestingly, patients who sought treatment for the abuse of any
substance had higher mean opioid prescriptions than Kentuckians receiving
controlled substance prescriptions but who did not seek substance abuse
treatment (Table 5.2). Hydrocodone prescriptions were the most frequent opioid
prescriptions amongst patients with treatment discharges as well as patients with
controlled substance prescriptions but no treatment discharges (p<0.001).
Patients with any treatment discharges had been dispensed significantly more
hydrocodone than other types of opioids.
Table 5.2 Mean Prescriptions for Kentucky Patients with and without Substance
Abuse Treatment Discharges
Patients with ANY
treatment
discharges
7.31
1.02
3.69
0.01
1.34
0.41

Mean Prescriptions

Total Opioids
Oxycodone
Hydrocodone
Hydromorphone
Buprenorphine
Other Opioids

Patients with NO
treatment
discharges
2.68
0.39
1.52
0.01
0.07
0.29

P-value

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.031
<0.001
<0.001

Oxycodone prescriptions were significant predictors of heroin treatment
discharge

in

each

regression

specification

(Table

5.3,

Table

5.4).

Hydromorphone prescriptions were the most strongly correlated opioid with
heroin treatment discharges (OR: 1.14, 95% CI: 1.05-1.24). Hydrocodone,
buprenorphine, and other opioid prescriptions were also significant predictors of
heroin treatment discharge (Table 5.3, Figure 5.3). Females were 9 percent less
likely than males to have a heroin treatment discharge (OR: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.860.96) and every year increase in age was associated with a 4 percent decrease
in the odds of having a heroin treatment discharge.
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Table 5.3 Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid Prescriptions Associated
with Heroin Treatment Discharges
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence
Interval
Fiscal Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
Female
Age
Number of Prescribers
Number of Pharmacies
Oxycodone Prescriptions
Hydrocodone Prescriptions
Hydromorphone Prescriptions
Buprenorphine Prescriptions
All Other Opioid Prescriptions

Reference year
1.30**
1.86**
3.27**
0.91**
0.96**
0.98**
1.01
1.04**
1.01**
1.14**
1.01**
1.03**

--1.20 to 1.42
1.71 to 2.03
3.03 to 3.54
0.86 to 0.96
0.96 to 0.96
0.96 to 0.99
0.99 to 1.02
1.03 to 1.05
1.00 to 1.02
1.05 to 1.24
1.00 to 1.01
1.02 to 1.04

*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05

Figure 5.3 Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid Prescriptions
Associated with Heroin Treatment Discharges

Table 5.4 includes results with controls for previous discharges and
interactions between year of discharge and number of previous discharges.
Females were 14 percent less likely to have a discharge for heroin than males
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(95% CI: 0.82-0.92), but were 1.29 times more likely to have a treatment
discharge for pharmaceutical opioids than males (95% CI: 1.24-1.34).
Buprenorphine prescriptions were associated with an increased likelihood of
treatment discharges for pharmaceutical opioids (OR: 1.08; 95% CI: 1.07-1.08).
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Table 5.4 Alternative Specification: Patient Characteristics and Number of Opioid
Prescriptions associated with Heroin and Opioid Discharges
Heroin Discharges
Opioid Discharges
Odds Ratio
95% CI
Odds Ratio
95% CI
Fiscal Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
Female
Age
Number of Prescribers
Number of
Pharmacies
Oxycodone
Prescriptions
Hydrocodone
Prescriptions
Hydromorphone
Prescriptions
Buprenorphine
Prescriptions
All Other Opioid
Prescriptions
Number of Previous
Discharges
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Interaction: Previous
Discharges and Year
n discharges X 2011
n discharges X 2012
n discharges X 2013

Reference year
1.33**
1.80**
4.31**
0.86**
0.96**
0.98**
1.01

--1.14 to 1.54
1.55 to 2.10
3.74 to 4.96
0.82 to 0.92
0.96 to 0.96
0.97 to 0.99
0.99 to 1.02

Reference year
1.25**
1.58**
1.24**
1.29**
0.97**
0.97**
1.05**

--1.15 to 1.35
1.45 to 1.73
1.14 to 1.36
1.24 to 1.34
0.97 to 0.97
0.96 to 0.98
1.04 to 1.06

1.04**

1.03 to 1.05

1.08**

1.07 to 1.09

1.01**

1.01 to 1.02

1.02**

1.01 to 1.02

1.14**

1.05 to 1.24

0.94

0.88 to 1.02

1.00

1.00 to 1.01

1.08**

1.07 to 1.08

1.03**

1.02 to 1.04

1.03**

1.02 to 1.04

Reference
1.84**
2.56**
2.69**
3.40**
4.05**
3.30**
3.52**
6.08**
7.71**
3.16**
1 (single case)
4.95**
1 (single case)
1 (single case)

--1.69 to 2.00
2.31 to 2.84
2.34 to 3.06
2.92 to 3.96
3.36 to 4.87
2.62 to 3.96
2.68 to 4.62
4.53 to 8.15
5.57 to 10.66
1.83 to 5.45
--2.83 to 8.64
-----

Reference
1.51**
1.75**
1.97**
2.34**
2.07**
2.06**
1.42**
4.31**
1.87**
2.75**
2.75**
1.10
3.76**
1 (single case)

--1.43 to 1.59
1.64 to 1.87
1.81 to 2.15
2.11 to 2.60
1.81 to 2.35
1.76 to 2.42
1.18 to 1.71
3.41 to 5.45
1.45 to 2.40
1.82 to 4.15
1.92 to 3.95
0.73 to 1.67
2.22 to 6.35
---

0.98
1.08**
0.98

0.95 to 1.02
1.03 to 1.12
0.95 to 1.02

0.97*
0.99
1.05**

0.95 to 0.99
0.97 to 1.02
1.11 to 1.30

*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05.
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Discussion
Although opioid prescribing decreased overall during the study period
among all persons in Kentucky receiving controlled substance prescriptions,
hydrocodone and hydromorphone prescriptions increased among heroin
treatment discharge patients following the implementation of House Bill 1. This
finding suggests that the PDMP and prescribing provisions in House Bill 1 may
have influenced which substances were preferred in opioid-seeking behaviors.
Alternatively, HB1 may have influenced shifts in prescribing behaviors.
The findings of this analysis also indicate that prescription opioid
consumption amongst individuals with substance abuse treatment stays for any
substance, even non-opioid substances, is higher than prescription opioid
consumption in the Kentucky population as a whole. This lends further support to
the theory that substance use disorders tend to develop into poly-abuse when
the supply of the preferred substance becomes limited or sporadic. PDMPs and
other prescription opioid abuse deterrent policies and regulations have been
enacted with almost exclusive supply-side restrictions of prescription opioids,
while few policies have attempted to curb demand via the expansion of treatment
opportunities or increased public insurance coverage of rigorous treatment
options. The implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 enabled participating states to expand their Medicaid eligibility and
coverage to include “essential” treatments for substance use disorders;103
however,

the

substance

use

disorder

treatments

recommended

for

reimbursement and classified as “essential” are typically behavioral and
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counseling-based treatments and place substantial barriers on evidence-based
medication assisted therapies.104
There are several limitations in this study. First, substance abuse
treatment data from private-pay only facilities was not available in the TEDS
dataset, which means that it is difficult to generalize prescription opioid trends
amongst patients enrolled in these mixed public and private pay treatment
facilities to the patient population who enrolled in private-pay only facilities. Next,
prescription data from KASPER was not available for opioid prescriptions that
were dispensed during inpatient hospital stays or to patients that were dispensed
opioids as part of a medication-assisted substance abuse treatment regimen
(i.e., buprenorphine prescribed by a Primary Care Physician would appear in
KASPER data, but buprenorphine dispensed by an outpatient clinic in
conjunction with a medication-assisted treatment program would not appear in
KASPER data). Lastly, treatment discharge records and prescription data for
patients that received treatment and prescriptions across state lines were not
available from either data source. It is possible that some Kentuckians sought
health care services involving controlled substances or treatment from providers
in other states following the tightening of pain clinic regulations and PDMP usage
as outlined in HB1. Despite these limitations, there appears to be a relationship
between prescription opioid utilization and heroin abuse that merits further
exploration.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Impact of Naloxone Access Policies on Opioid Overdose Deaths
Chapter Summary: This final empirical chapter explores other state-level policy interventions in
opioid abuse and diversion by widening the focus from PDMP programs to include broader opioid
intervention policies, namely naloxone access laws. Naloxone is a medication used to reverse
heroin and/or pharmaceutical opioid overdose, which some states have made more widely
available to consumers at risk of overdose. This analysis examines the relationship between
naloxone access policies and PDMPs with opioid overdose mortality using data from the CDC for
1999-2012.

Pharmaceutical opioid and/or heroin overdoses, largely reversible with
timely administration of a medication called naloxone,105 have risen substantially
since 1999. In fact, unintentional opioid overdose poisoning deaths have now
surpassed vehicle accidents as the number one cause of injury death in adult
citizens of the United States.73 Naloxone is not a controlled substance, but has
been traditionally administered by medical professionals in an emergency
department environment. The time-sensitive nature of administration for
successful overdose reversal, coupled with a low potential for abuse, has
prompted several states to implement policies that increase access to naloxone
for individuals at risk of opioid and/or heroin overdose.
Naloxone distribution programs have been declared successes by cities
and states that have implemented them. Between 1996-2010, naloxone was
distributed by these programs to 53,032 persons nationwide, which resulted in
10,171 overdose reversals.106 The majority of injectable users report willingness
to administer naloxone to others during an overdose (88.5 percent), particularly if
they have used heroin, or have witnessed or have had an overdose
themselves.107 This street-level treatment option for overdose has been hailed as
a lifesaver where authorized, due to the relatively high prevalence of overdose
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experiences in self-reported users of injected substances such as heroin. In a
survey of 329 people using injected drugs, Lagu et al. (2006) found that 34.6
percent had experienced an overdose themselves and 64.6 percent had
witnessed an overdose.107
In addition to naloxone distribution programs, which are typically
implemented by city or local health departments, states have implemented
policies to increase access to naloxone where outright distribution is not
available. Three of these naloxone access policies are examined in this analysis:
the authority of prescribers to write prescriptions for third parties (e.g., a parent
could receive a naloxone prescription for their child if they felt he/she was at risk
for overdose), standing order prescriptions (e.g., a state director of public health
or similar official may “write” a prescription for all persons in the state, meaning
that naloxone would be available for purchase at pharmacies without an explicit
prescription, or non-prescribers such as pharmacists may dispense without a
prescription), and prescriber immunity policies that protect prescribers from
liability in case the party receiving naloxone on their behalf experiences overdose
mortality or morbidity. Pilot studies evaluating these naloxone access policies
have found evidence for the effectiveness of third party prescribing, in particular,
for reducing heroin overdose deaths in communities where the practice is
permitted.108 The purpose of this piece is to determine whether these state
naloxone access policies may have contributed to changes in state opioid
overdose mortality rates.
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Methods
Data for the dependent variable, pharmaceutical opioid and heroin
overdose deaths per state-year from 1999-2012, were obtained from the Centers
for

Disease

Control

and

Prevention’s

Wide-Ranging

Online

Data

for

Epidemiological Research (WONDER) database. Deaths were identified using
the following International Classification of Disease version 10 codes for opioid
poisoning: X40-44 for accidental poisoning deaths, X60-64 for intentional
poisoning deaths, and Y10-14 for poisoning deaths of undetermined intent.
These codes were coupled with underlying substance codes of T40.0-40.4,
representing opium, heroin, “other” opioids, methadone, synthetic opioids, or
T40.6, representing unspecified opioids. Diagnosis codes and underlying
substance codes were identified based on reviews of the literature as well as a
line-item review of the International Classification of Disease billing code
diagnoses listings.109-112 A state-year death total was not included in WONDER if
there were fewer than 10 overdose deaths attributed to a particular substance in
a given state and year, for decedent privacy protection.
The presence of state naloxone access policies, including third party
naloxone prescribing authorization, standing order prescriptions and prescriber
immunity laws, were operationalized as independent dummy variables at the
month-year of implementation. Implementation dates and formal definitions of
state statutes meeting the criteria to be classified as one of these three policies
were derived from the National Institute on Drug Abuse’s and Legal Science
Partner’s 2012 report on Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws.113 The
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distribution of count of overdose deaths were found to be over-dispersed
(variance>mean); therefore, a negative binomial, time series regression model
with state and year fixed effects was constructed to estimate the relationship
between naloxone access policy implementation and opioid overdose deaths.
Lag years of the dependent variable (deaths) were used to address potential
endogeneity problems. State-level control variables included: state population,
operational PDMP, PDMP characteristics as defined in Chapter 2, and state
average annual unemployment rate.
Results
During the study period, eight states implemented at least one of the three
naloxone access policies examined: New Mexico, New York, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Washington state. Nationally,
mean state pharmaceutical opioid overdoses increased 4 fold during the study
period, while mean heroin overdoses also increased but at a much slower rate
(Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 State Mean and Median Opioid Overdose Deaths, 1999-2012
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Pharmaceutical Opioid Overdoses
Mean (SD)
Median
72.63 (152.15)
32
81.49 (117.37)
50
102.53 (116.51)
92
141.57 (188.50)
116
162.86 (194.08)
120
189.12 (215.79)
140
209.80 (210.33)
164
264.94 (261.29)
214
279.18 (281.34)
231
286.39 (295.40)
224
302.47 (327.72)
216
322.04 (340.28)
229
328.53 (336.84)
256
319.54 (292.92)
260
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Heroin Overdoses
Mean (SD)
Median
88.61 (151.58)
23
85.02 (127.43)
30
83.84 (123.28)
31
94.98 (143.04)
33
95.08 (137.78)
33
83.29 (114.31)
35
87.84 (117.14)
41
90.78 (124.07)
34
92.27 (121.05)
44
108.51 (135.56)
61
107.98 (136.23)
53
98.02 (129.75)
48
130.80 (159.39)
84
182.22 (202.39)
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For a glimpse into recent overdose mortality trends specific to Kentucky,
Figure 6.1 was created with data from Kentucky Office of Vital Statistics. 114 The
black vertical line represents the implementation of House Bill 1 in Kentucky in
July 2012, which was discussed in the previous chapter. Kentucky, specifically,
experienced an upward trend in heroin overdose mortality from 2011 through
2013, while pharmaceutical opioid overdose mortality trended downwards.
Figure 6.1 Overdose Deaths in Kentucky, by Substance for 2009-2013

States authorizing third party naloxone prescriptions experienced 35%
fewer

pharmaceutical

opioid

overdose

deaths

per

year

after

policy

implementation (95% CI: 0.46-0.95), but no statistically significant change in
pharmaceutical opioid

overdose

deaths were

observed

in

states

that

implemented standing order prescriptions and prescriber immunity. No significant
change in heroin overdose deaths was observed in states authorizing third party
prescriptions, standing order prescriptions, or prescriber immunity (Table 6.2).
Operational PDMP presence was associated with 10.55 times greater heroin
overdoses (95% CI: 4.75-23.44), and there were also relationships between
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increased heroin overdoses with PDMP interstate data sharing (IRR: 1.37; 95%
CI: 1.12-1.68), data transmission occurring more frequently than once per week
(IRR: 1.89; 95% CI: 1.53-2.34), as well as the monitoring of Schedule V
substances (IRR: 1.77; 95% CI 1.35-2.32). The monitoring of Schedule III
substances was associated with a 90 percent decrease in heroin overdoses
(95% CI: 0.04-0.24) and controls for time accounted for minor relationships with
heroin overdose.
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Table 6.2 The Association between Pharmaceutical Opioid and Heroin Overdose
Deaths with Naloxone Access Policy Implementation
Opioid Overdose

Heroin Overdose

IRR (95% CI)

IRR (95% CI)

1.14 (0.93-1.40)
1.22 (0.81-1.84)
0.65 (0.46-0.95)*

0.93 (0.78-1.11)
0.98 (0.56-1.72)
0.89 (0.53-1.49)

1.66 (1.04-2.67)*
0.81 (0.68-0.97)*
1.00 (0.85-1.17)
1.08 (0.89-1.32)
0.95 (0.82-1.11)
0.88 (0.73-1.05)
1.02 (0.91-1.05)
1.26 (1.11-1.44)*
0.69 (0.42-1.15)
1.22 (1.04-1.43)*
0.79 (0.67-0.94)*

10.55 (4.75-23.44)*
0.73 (0.53-1.01)
0.95 (0.74-1.21)
1.21 (0.88-1.66)
0.99 (0.78-1.26)
0.81 (0.60-1.09)
1.37 (1.12-1.68)*
1.89 (1.53-2.34)*
0.10 (0.04-0.24)*
1.77 (1.35-2.32)*
0.80 (0.60-1.07)

1.00 (1.00-1.00)*
0.99 (0.96-1.02)

1.00 (1.00-1.00)*
0.97 (0.92-1.03)

1.36 (1.07-1.75)*
2.03 (1.60-2.58)*
2.75 (2.19-3.46)*
3.24 (2.59-4.05)*
3.99 (3.20-4.96)*
4.40 (3.54-5.46)*
5.48 (4.42-6.79)*
5.77 (4.62-7.20)*
6.40 (4.90-8.37)*
6.42 (4.88-8.46)*
6.88 (5.29-8.95)*
6.94 (5.39-8.93)*
663

0.92 (0.75-1.11)
0.80 (0.62-1.02)
0.99 (0.80-1.23)
0.97 (0.78-1.20)
0.85 (0.69-1.04)
0.83 (0.67-1.03)
0.81 (0.65-0.99)*
0.88 (0.68-1.10)
1.22 (0.86-1.72)
1.24 (0.86-1.78)
1.02 (0.73-1.42)
1.30 (0.96-1.75)
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Variable Description
Naloxone Policy Variables
Prescriber Immunity
Standing Order Prescriptions
Third Party Naloxone Prescriptions
PDMP Covariates
PDMP Operational
Proactive Prescriber
Proactive Law Enforcement
Law Access
Compulsory Registration
Compulsory Prescriber Use
Interstate Data Sharing
Data Transmission <1 Week
Schedule III Monitored
Schedule V Monitored
Unscheduled Substances Monitored
Other Covariates
State Population
Average Annual Unemployment Rate
Year (reference 2000)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total State-Years (n)
*Indicates statistically significant: p<0.05.

The magnitude of the relationship between opioid overdose deaths in
states with operational PDMPs (IRR: 1.66; 95% CI: 1.04-2.67) is overshadowed
substantially by the magnitude of the relationship with heroin overdose deaths,
though both are positively associated.
Pharmaceutical opioid overdoses have similar relationships to PDMP
features as heroin overdoses, with observed increases in opioid overdoses

92

among states with Schedule V monitoring (IRR: 1.22; 95% CI: 1.04-1.43) and
increases in opioid overdoses among states with data transmission more
frequently than once per week (IRR: 1.26; 95% CI: 1.11-1.44). Proactive or
unsolicited reports to prescribers from PDMPs, however, appear to be
significantly associated with decreases in pharmaceutical opioid overdose deaths
(IRR: 0.81; 95% CI: 0.68-0.97), but not with heroin overdose deaths. The
passage of time is also more significantly associated with increases in
pharmaceutical opioid deaths, whereas heroin overdose deaths have increased
slowly throughout the study period.
Discussion
Findings from this analysis demonstrate that decreases in heroin overdose
death rates observed in states with expanded implementation of naloxone
access policies were not statistically significant. However, pharmaceutical opioid
death rates have slowed in states with third party naloxone prescriptions. It is
possible that the naloxone access policies examined in this chapter were
enacted in states with particularly severe heroin epidemics, so the rate of heroin
overdose deaths may have been slowed by these policies in a manner unable to
be captured by this type of analysis.
Research on optimal naloxone access laws and their implementation is
needed as naloxone has few documented negative health effects and has been
determined to be a cost-effective method of saving lives.115 It should be noted
that this analysis has several limitations. Most significantly, there is no control for
the extent of naloxone access policy enforcement in the states that implemented
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the examined policies. Also, there is no control for exogenous events and trends
that possibly contributed to changes in opioid overdose mortality beyond PDMP
features. Other contributing factors to the observed downward mortality trends in
some states could include the “methadone migration” (a term I use to describe
changing prescribing preferences for buprenorphine/naloxone combination
products over the traditional, but overdose-prone, methadone in medicationassisted substance abuse treatment programs), the implementation of needle
exchange programs, or states that enhanced substance abuse treatment
availability during the study period. Lastly, this analysis does not capture
overdoses that did not result in deaths. Future expansions of this analysis should
include emergency department discharge data for non-fatal opioid overdose
treatment.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Chapter Summary: The final chapter concludes the dissertation by re-iterating themes observed
throughout the empirical analyses and synthesizing these findings to expand the existing policy
implementation and evaluation literature on state-level interventions in opioid abuse and
diversion. Recommendations for future PDMP policy are presented and discussed.

The law enforcement and medical communities have expressed markedly
different perspectives for the most effective methods of defining and solving the
problem of prescription drug abuse and diversion. Some of these differences are
most apparent in the language used to describe their respective goals and policy
recommendations. For example, law enforcement communities tend to define
prescription drug abuse and diversion in terms of a problem to be met with by
force (e.g., the war on drugs, the drug threat), whereas the medical community
tends to define the problem using terminology such as “epidemic” or “crisis of
abuse.” This difference in perspective has become even more apparent as policy
efforts to combat the problem from both law enforcement and medical
communities have been met with few measureable successes. Reports and
statements about PDMPs issued by health agencies tend to make references to
the Principle of Balance, which is the effort to reduce abuse and diversion while
providing access to controlled substances for legitimate medical need, and
reports and statements issued by law enforcement agencies typically neglect to
include this language.
The Department of Justice releases an annual publication titled “The
National Drug Threat Assessment”, which features an analysis on nationwide
drug crime and reports from lower level regional and district officials. An annual
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survey of local law enforcement conducted from 2005 to 2009 found that officials
have steadily increased their perceptions of prescription drugs, particularly
opioids, as the greatest “drug threat” to their region (3.9 percent in 2005 to 9.8
percent in 2009).20 The nomenclature used to describe the drugs themselves in
these types of publications is noticeably different between law enforcement
agencies and health agencies. For example, law enforcement agencies and the
court systems tend to use the ill-defined term “narcotic” when describing certain
controlled substances, whereas health agencies and clinicians often use more
clinically-specific drug class terms, such as “opioid”, “sedative”, or “stimulant;”1
however, it is interesting to note that law enforcement and health agencies seem
equally likely to use the terms “opiate” and “opioid” interchangeably despite the
problems of using the oft too-specific “opiate.” On an even more fundamental
level, substances are more likely to be referred to by one of several clinically
oriented terms (e.g. medications, drug therapy, prescription drugs, and
nonmedical versus medical use of prescription drugs) by health agencies and
health professionals, whereas law enforcement agencies tend to avoid these
qualifiers by using the catch-all term “drugs” to describe almost any type of
ingested, injected, or inhaled substance for medical or nonmedical use.
Additionally, the law enforcement communities and medical communities
have both developed the problematic tendency to refer to persons with
substance use disorders using reductive, and sometimes hostile, language.
Terms like “addict” are commonplace in law enforcement documentation
whereas the clinically equivalent version “abuser” crops up equally as often in
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medical literature written by health professionals whose specialties lay outside
the treatment of substance use disorder. If an effort was made to agree upon the
language used in the reporting and research of controlled substance trends, then
there may be increased potential for more productive collaboration between law
enforcement, health agencies, and the communities who face the brunt of
prescription opioid abuse and diversion problems with fewer tensions.
Policy Implications
Changes in the marketplace for prescription opioids, one of the most
widely prescribed classes of controlled substances, could have implications
throughout the health care system for insurers who reimburse for opioids, for
providers who treat patients with opioids and for opioid use-related disorders,
and for patient-consumers who may face barriers to access for opioids or barriers
to access for treatment of opioid use disorders. Any changes in the quantity of
prescription medications reimbursed by Medicaid, in particular, represent
significant shifts in the marketplace for prescription drugs, as Medicaid is the
largest health insurer in the United States.116
State

Medicaid

programs

are

dispensing

(or,

more

accurately,

reimbursing) an increasing amount of controlled substances each year, but
states that have implemented PDMPs tend to dispense fewer total units of
controlled substances to their respective Medicaid beneficiaries. The presence of
a PDMP would appear to be influencing changes in prescriber and dispenser
behavior, but specific PDMP policy characteristics, such as the ability to share
data with other state PDMPs, shape the nature of that behavior change. The
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decrease in both higher and lower Scheduled controlled substance dispensing in
states with operational PDMPs would suggest that prescribers and dispensers
may

possibly

be

suffering

from

a

“chilling

effect”

(a

reduction

in

prescribing/dispensing due to fears of investigation), but the increase of units of
all Scheduled substances dispensed in states with law enforcement-housed
PDMPs would seem to contradict this notion. Perhaps providers are more
confident in making prescribing and dispensing decisions in states that
encourage access to consumer use history information when endorsed by law
enforcement agencies.
PDMP policies were intended to reduce abuse and diversion, but the
observed national increases in overdose mortality as well as substance abuse
treatment admissions since widespread state PDMP implementation implies that
these policies have not achieved this goal; however, it is possible that PDMP
policies have tempered the upward abuse trend. The coordination of state
program information sharing and the implementation of more-uniform PDMP
policies could intensify the intended impact of PDMPs, particularly if the intended
user groups are afforded adequate access to program data and the training to
use that data appropriately.
Recommendations and Conclusion
It is recommended that state-level PDMP programs reconcile statutes with
agency regulations (e.g., clarify professional licensure board requirements versus
“guidelines” for registration and participation), in cases where these bodies
experience conflicting language or when agencies have limited ability or
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resources to implement the regulations they have been charged with enacting.
For example, it is widely cited by state PDMPs and PDMP advocacy groups that
“most” states have interstate data-sharing capabilities, and while it is true that
most states have approved agreements to transmit interstate data, the reality is
that as of 2015 only 27 states have been able to successfully transmit data
across state lines and the majority of these transmissions are limited to border
states.
It is also recommended that states expand monitoring to lower Scheduled
substances if they are currently exempt from the PDMP, and to petition the FDA
and DEA to reconcile state-level Scheduling with the federal Schedule. Several
states have re-Scheduled upward substances such as hydrocodone and
tramadol due to perceived uptake in abuse and it is apparent that these states
respond to changes in problematic substance use more quickly than the federal
agencies.
Reconciliation between federal agency regulations and state PDMP
policies on law enforcement access is also recommended. The DEA, FBI, and
other federal investigative bodies are permitted to access state PDMP data
pursuant to active investigations, but this conflicts with some state laws that
restrict law enforcement access to PDMP data to cases where the investigative
body has a warrant, court order, or subpoena issued by a court within the state.
This conflict has come to a head recently in the state of Oregon, where Oregon’s
PDMP in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against the
DEA for unwarranted requests to access Oregon’s PDMP data. While a U.S.
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Circuit Court ruled in Oregon’s favor in 2014, the DEA has since issued an
appeal.63
It is also recommended that evaluations of PDMPs should continue to be
conducted so that states can process relevant outcomes data regarding the
effectiveness of such PDMP features as pharmacy data reporting frequency and
compulsory prescriber use. A crucial missing component in the formulation of
variables for PDMP features was the participation rates of prescribers,
pharmacists, and law enforcement officials in states that do not mandate usage.
Information about the frequency of use and the change in prescriber or dispenser
behavior resulting from PDMP use would provide a more complete measurement
tool of PDMP impact on dispensing and so it is recommended that state PDMPs
publish these data when available. Policy recommendations for related opioid
interventions, primarily naloxone access, are more difficult to formulate. It is still
unclear whether the observed trends in decreased opioid deaths in some states
were due to the changes in state-level naloxone access laws or to exogenous
factors. The results from the analyses conducted in the Chapters 5 and 6
suggest that there is an association between PDMPs, naloxone policy
interventions, substance abuse treatment enrollment, and overdose mortality, but
causality and the direction of this relationship has not been established with
certainty.
The use of “real world” data sources in this project included: aggregate
reimbursement claims from Medicaid, patient-level prescription data from
commercial health insurance, a novel data linkage between substance abuse
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facility records with individual controlled substance prescription histories from a
state PDMP, and publicly available policy and epidemiological data. The
analyses conducted throughout this project suggest the conclusion that the state
interventions in prescription opioid abuse in diversion known as PDMPs have
influenced far-reaching facets of the United States population’s health and safety,
such as; as consumer health outcomes by way of changes in substance abuse
treatment prevalence and changes in access to pain management care, the
market for prescription opioids and possibly illicit heroin substitutes, and health
care provider behaviors related to the treatment of pain and substance use
disorders.

101

APPENDIX A
PDMP Year Enacted and Year Operational, as of 2015
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Year
Enacted
2004
2008
2007
2011
1939
2005
2006
2010
2009
2011
1943
1986
1961
1997
2006
2008
1998
2006
2003
2011
1992
1988
2007
2005
--2011

Year
Operational
2007
2012
2008
2013
2009
2008
2008
2012
2011
2013
1996
1998
1999
2007
2009
2011
1999
2009
2005
2014
2010
2003
2010
2005
--2012

State
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia*
Wisconsin
Wyoming
District of
Columbia

Year
Enacted
2011
1995
2012
2008
2004
1972
2005
2005
2005
1990
2009
1972
1978
2006
2010
2003
1981
1995
2006
2002
2007
2002
2010
2004
2014

Year
Operational
2011
1997
2014
2012
2005
1973
2007
2008
2006
2006
2011
1973
2001
2008
2012
2007
1989
1997
2009
2006
2012
2002
2013
2005
2015

*Note: West Virginia originally adopted PDMP legislation in 1995; it was repealed soon after, and
then replaced with the contemporary version in 2002.
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APPENDIX B
Substance Abuse Treatment Admissions for 2000 and 2010
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